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SELF-DEFENSE AND THE MISTAKEN RACIST
Stephen P. Garvey*
How should the law of a liberal state respond when one person (D) kills another
person (1, who is black, because D believes that V is about to kill him, but
D would not have believed that V was about to kill him ifVhad been white?
Should D be exonerated on grounds of self-defense? Some commentators argue
that D's claim of self-defense should be reected and that he should be convicted,
either of murder or manslaughter, and punished accordingly.
I disagree. I argue that denying D's claim of self-defense would be at odds
with the principle that an actor should be punished, not for possessing or
choosing to possess racist or otherwise illiberal beliefs or desires, but only for
choosing to cause (or risk causing) harm when the law does not permit him
to make such a choice. Moreover, insofar as this principle can fairly be
characterized as one to which a liberal state must adhere, then a liberal
state should acknowledge D's claim of self-defense.
INTRODUCTION
Bernhard Goetz, a thirty-seven-year old white man with a "slight[]
build,"' boarded a New York subway three days before Christmas in
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December 1984. Four "noisy and boisterous"' young men,4 all of them
black,' were also onboard. Two of the young men approached Goetz.
6
"Give me five dollars," 7 one of them said. When the request was repeated,
8
Goetz opened fire with a concealed .38 caliber pistol loaded with five
rounds.9 He fired four shots in rapid succession, wounding three of the vic-
tims.'°After pausing to survey the scene," Goetz approached the fourth vic-
tim and said to him, "You seem to be all right, here's another."'2 He then
fired the final round. The bullet severed the victim's spinal cord, leaving
him paralyzed. 3 Most of the other passengers fled when the shooting started,
but two women, one of whom was black, 4 remained, "immobilized by
2. The statement of the facts that follows is based primarily on the principal opinion of
the New York Court of Appeals, which was in turn based heavily on pretrial statements
Goetz made to the police. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 43-44 (N.Y. 1986). The Court
of Appeals reversed a trial-court order dismissing certain counts of a second grand jury's
multiple-count indictment for attempted murder, assault, illegal possession of a firearm,
and reckless endangerment. See People v. Goetz, 502 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 5o
N.Y.S.2d 326 (N.Y. App. Div.), rev'd, 497 N.E.zd 41 (N.Y. 1986). Goetz was finally con-
victed on one count of criminal possession of a firearm in the third degree. He was sen-
tenced to one year in prison, five years' probation, and a $5,ooo fine. See People v. Goetz,
529 N.Y.S.2d 782 (App. Div.), aff'd, 532 N.E.2d 1273 (N.Y. 1988); see also Ronald Sullivan,
Goetz Is Given One-Year Term on Gun Charge, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1989, at Bi.
For book-length accounts of the case, see Fletcher, supra note I; Mark Lesly & Charles
Shuttlesworth, Subway Gunman: A Juror's Account of the Bernhard Goetz Trial (1988);
and Lillian B. Rubin, Quiet Rage: Bernie Goetz in a Time of Madness (1986).
3. See Fletcher, supra note i, at i.
4. Two of the victims Games Ramseur and Barry Allen) were eighteen. The other two
(Darrell Cabey and Troy Canty) were nineteen. Id. at 2-3.
5. Id. at i.
6. Goetz, 4 9 7 N.E.2d at 43 ("Canty approached Goetz, possibly with Allen beside him.").
7. Id.
8. Id. at 44.
9. Id. at 43.
to. Id.
ix. Id. at 44. But cf. Fletcher, supra note i, at 171 (noting that "eight witnesses testified
that they did not hear a pause").
12. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 44.
13. Id. The fourth victim was Darell Cabey. Cabey later filed a civil suit against Goetz and won
a $43 million judgment in 1996. Civil Complaint Against "Subway Vigilante" Bernhard Goetz
Filed '85' and Tried '96', htTp://www.lectlaw.com/files/cas9i.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2oo8).
14. Fletcher, supra note i, at 5.
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fear."15 Goetz "sa[id] some soothing words" 6 to them and jumped off the
train. He later turned himself in. 7
Charged with attempted second-degree murder,'8 Goetz claimed that he
acted in self-defense, according to which an actor is, generally speaking,
permitted to use deadly force against an aggressor if-but only if-he rea-
sonably believed that the use of deadly force was necessary to avoid death
or grievous bodily harm to himself.'9 In other words, what the defendant
believed were the facts at the time of the crime is not what matters, or more
15. Id. at 2.
16. Id.
17. Goetz, 497 N.E.zd at 44.
18. See id. at 43. The jury acquitted Goetz on all charges (including the attempted murder
charges), with the single exception of the firearms possession count. Although "the defense
[had] never seriously challenged whether, as a matter of fact, Goetz intended to cause death by
shooting the four youths," Fletcher, supra note t, at 185, the jury nonetheless believed that he
lacked the intent needed to convict on attempted murder, see, e.g., id. at 186-88; Lesly, supra
note z, at 279-82, and so never reached the question of self-defense as an affirmative defense.
The jurors believed that Goetz lacked the requisite intent because they "incorporated Goetz's
purpose of defending himself into their analysis of his intention [to kill]." Fletcher, supra note i,
at 187. For the jury Goetz's intent was to defend himself, and in order to do that, he intended
to pull the trigger on the gun. But he did not intend to cause death. Causing death was merely
a foreseeable consequence of pulling the trigger. Although this way of thinking about self-
defense is generally at odds with contemporary thinking, see, e.g., id. at 186, it nonetheless has
a long history rooted in the Catholic doctrine of double effect. See, e.g., Fiona Leverick,
Killing in Self-Defence 53-54 (2oo6) (describing "appeal[s] to the doctrine of double effect" as
an "explan[ation for] the justification of killing in self-defence" but concluding that the
attempted explanation is ultimately unpersuasive). The underlying philosophical ques-
tion at issue here deals with how one should go about individuating the objects of
intention. See, e.g., Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal
Law 469 (1997) (arguing in favor of a "very fine-grained theory" of individuation).
19. See, e.g., Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law § t8.oi[E], at 239 (4 th ed.
2oo6) ("A defendant is justified in killing a supposed aggressor if the defendant's belief in
this regard is objectively reasonable."); Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law § 5.7(c), at 493-95
(3 d ed. 2000) ("[S]elf-defense generally require[s] that the defendant's belief in the neces-
sity of using [deadly] force to prevent harm to himself be a reasonable one .... "); Leverick,
supra note i8, at t61 ("The majority of common law jurisdictions take the approach that
only a reasonable mistake about the existence of an attack should be permitted to ground
an acquittal."); Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 1127 (3d ed. 1982)
("[D]eadly force is authorized to defend against deadly force if this reasonably seems nec-
essary to avoid death or great bodily injury.").
At the time Goetz was tried, New York law permitted (and continues to permit) an actor
to use deadly physical force against another person when he reasonably believes that the
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precisely, not all that matters, in the law of self-defense.2" He must believe
that he needed to use deadly force in order to avoid being the victim of
deadly force, and it must have been reasonable for him to have so believed.
The facts themselves, however, do not matter.2' An actor who kills because
he reasonably believes that he is about to be killed is entitled to an acquit-
tal on grounds of self-defense even if it later turns out that he was wrong.
Again, what matters is what the actor reasonably believed were the facts,
not the facts themselves. Call this the reasonable-belief rule.22
"other person is using or about to use deadly physical force," N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)
(McKinney 2007), where deadly physical force means "physical force which, under the cir-
cumstances in which it is used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physical
injury." Id. § io.oo(ri). It also permitted (and continues to permit) an actor to use deadly
physical force against another person when he reasonably believes that the other person is
"committing or attempting to commit a ... robbery," id. § 3 5 .I5 (2)(b), where robbery is
defined as larceny in which the actor "uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force
upon another person," id. § 16o.oo, whether or not that physical force rises to the level of
deadly physical force. See also 2 Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 13i(d), at 83
("Some states expressly authorize the use of deadly defensive force in response to certain
enumerated offenses.").
2o. An actor who kills because he unreasonably believed that he was about to be killed
may in some jurisdictions be entitled to a partial defense usually described as "imperfect
self-defense." See Dressier, supra note I9, § 18.03, at 249.
21. The facts may matter as to whether the defense is characterized as an excuse or as a
justification. See id. § I8.o4[A]-[B], at 250-51.
22. According to a recent annotation, the reasonable-belief rule is the majority rule in
the United States. See John E Wagner, Jr., Annotation, Standard for Determination of
Reasonableness of Criminal Defendant's Belief, for Purposes of Self-Defense Claim, That
Physical Force Is Necessary-Modern Cases, 73 A.L.R.4 th 993, 996 (1989 & Supp. 2oo6)
("[M]ost states having penal codes have ... opted for a 'reasonable belief' rule . . ").
However, according to at least one writer, it was not always so. See Richard Singer, The
Resurgence of Men Rea: II-Honest But Unreasonable Mistake of Fact in Self-Defense,
28 B.C. L. Rev. 459, 470-90 (1987) (arguing that the reasonable-belief rule was not incor-
porated into American law until the mid-nineteenth century).
Under English law, an actor who honestly but unreasonably believed that he need-
ed to use force to protect himself from force is deemed to lack the intent to inflict
"unlawful" force. Consequently, an honest belief in the need to use deadly force is suf-
ficient to preclude conviction. See Regina v. Williams, [1984] 78 Crim. App. 276, 281
("In a case of self-defence ... if the jury came to the conclusion that the defendant
believed . . . that force was necessary to protect himself .... then the prosecution have
not proved their case."); Beckford v. Regina, [1987] 85 Crim. App. 378, 385 ("[A] gen-
uine belief in facts which if true would justify self-defense [must] be a defence to a
crime of personal violence because the belief negates the intent to act unlawfully."). For
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The Goetz case was at the time a "cause c~lbre,"'23 and it has since
passed into the canon of the criminal law, at least in the United States.24
Few American lawyers will have left law school without having encoun-
tered it. Nonetheless, my present goal is neither to analyze nor comment
on the actual case itself, which is rich in detail as well as controversy.
Instead, my goal is to better understand the law of self-defense, and in par-
ticular its insistence that an actor is entitled to claim self-defense if and
only if his belief that he needed to use deadly force in order to avoid death
or grievous bodily injury was reasonable.
In order to accomplish that goal without needless distraction related to
the real case of Bernhard Goetz, or any real case for that matter, I ask you to
imagine another defendant, who I will call Goetz*. Goetz*, unlike the real
commentary on English law, see Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law § 6.6,
at 235 (4 th ed. 2003) ("[A] putative defence will succeed whenever D raises a reasonable
doubt that he actually held the mistaken belief, no matter how outlandish that belief
may have been."); A.P. Simester & G.R. Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine
§ i7 .1(iii), at 550 (2d ed. 2003) ("[A] person who believed force was necessary to pro-
tect another from violence would lack an intent to inflict unlawful force."); William
Wilson, Criminal Law: Doctrine and Theory § 9.io(B), at 253 (2d ed. 2003) ("The ...
requirement that the mistake made be a reasonable one was abandoned [in
Williams]."); Andrew Simester, Mistakes in Defence, 12 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 295, 295
(1992) (arguing that the "reasoning in [Williams and Beckford] is unsound and has
unfortunate implications for the criminal law in general"). Cf. George Fletcher,
Mistake in the Model Penal Code: A False False Problem, 19 Rutgers L.J. 649, 652
(1988) (noting that "[i]f every relevant factual issue were intrinsic to the required intent,
any mistake would be a good defense").
23. Sanford H. Kadish et al., Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and Materials 743
(8th ed. 2007). But see Franklin E. Zimring, Hardly the Trial of the Century, 87 Mich. L.
Rev. 1307, 1309 (1989) (book review) ("[W]hat is there about [the Goetz case] that justifies
its landmark status in public discussions of crime and criminal justice? Perhaps there is less
than we might suppose.").
24. The case is reproduced in several criminal-law casebooks. See Richard J. Bonnie et al.,
Criminal Law 419 (2d ed. 2004); Ronald N. Boyce et al., Criminal Law and Procedure: Cases
and Materials 912 (ioth ed. 2007); Joseph G. Cook & Paul Marcus, Criminal Law 691 (4 th
ed.1999); Joshua Dressier, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law 504 (4th ed. 2007); Markus
D. Dubber & Mark G. Kelman, American Criminal Law: Cases, Statutes, and Comments
542 (zoo5); Kadish et al., supra note 23, at 739; John Kaplan et al., Criminal Law: Cases and
Materials 521 (sth ed. 2004); Wayne R. LaFave, Modern Criminal Law: Cases, Comments
and Questions 5Io (4 th ed. 2oo6); Cynthia Lee & Angela Harris, Criminal Law: Cases and
Materials 727 (2005); Andre A. Moenssens et al., Criminal Law: Cases and Comments 518
(7 th ed. 2003); Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law: Case Studies and Controversies 559 (2005).
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Goetz, fired only one shot from his .38, not all five,25 and he hit only one of
the young men, not all four. The other three fled unharmed. Moreover, in
order to avoid unnecessary doctrinal complications arising from the law of
attempts, 26 I also ask you to imagine that Goetz*'s first and only shot killed its
intended victim, rather than simply wounding him. Finally, whatever the real
Goetz believed, I ask you to assume that Goetz* did indeed believe that he
was about to be killed, and that he needed to use deadly force in order to
avoid being killed.27 I will hereafter refer to this belief-I am about to be
killed, and deadly force is necessary to avoid being killed-as the belief thatp.
The principal question the Goetz* case raises is this: Who is the reason-
able person? According to the standard analysis, we need to answer that
question in order to know whether or not it was reasonable for Goetz* to
have believed that p, and therefore whether or not he should have been
acquitted on grounds of self-defense or convicted of murder. Moreover, accord-
ing to the standard analysis, that question in turn gives rise to another: Which
characteristics of the real defendant should be imputed to the reasonable
person?" One answer is that all of them should be imputed. But that answer
25. According to Fletcher, "[ilf Goetz really did pause after the fourth shot, physically
approach [the final victim], and say, 'You seem to [be doing] all right; here's another,' it
would be almost impossible to construe this shot as a reasonable act of self-defense."
Fletcher, supra note i, at 170. But see id. at 171 (noting that the testimony of other wit-
nesses suggested no such pause); Singer, supra note 22, at 516 ("[E]ven Goetz's fifth shot
could be found by a jury to have emanated from a swirl of anxiety and loss of control
which continued far after the last shot.").
26. See, e.g., Dressier, supra note 19, § 27.05, at 417-22 (discussing the mens rea of
attempts).
27. Although the discussion hereafter proceeds on the facts of Goetz*, and not on the facts
of the real Goetz case, I nonetheless suspect, though I could of course be wrong, that those
who would have been disinclined to acquit the real Goetz will also be disinclined to acquit
Goetz*. I have this suspicion because I doubt that the features I strip away from the real case
are really what matters to most people who believe that the real Goetz did not act in self-
defense. What matters to them is the fact hat Goetz believed that he was about to be attacked
because he was a racist, and would not have believed that he was about to be attacked had he
not been a racist. But I will be assuming that those facts are true of Goetz* too.
28. See, e.g., Dressier, supra note i9, § 18.o5, at 253 ("The crux of the issue, at least as courts
see the matter, is: ... [T]o what extent should courts permit juries, as factfinders, to incorpo-
rate the defendant's own characteristics or life experiences in the 'reasonable person' stan-
dard?"); Cynthia Lee, Murder and the Reasonable Man 209 (2003) ("Since most jurisdictions
utilize a hybrid subjectivized-objective standard, a critical question is which of the defendant's
characteristics are or should be incorporated into the Reasonable Person standard?").
Paul Robinson and Michael Cahill have noted that "criminal-law theorists have not yet
been able to articulate a comprehensive principle that defines what should and should not
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is a nonstarter: imputing all of the defendant's characteristics to the reason-
able person would mean that the reasonable person just is the defendant,
such that any belief the defendant possessed would be "reasonable," just
because he possessed it.2' Beyond that, things get less clear. Which charac-
teristics are in, and which are out? Thankfully, in the context of a case like
Goetz*, the discussion usually focuses on the most salient of the defen-
dant's characteristics: his putative racism. The principal question can
therefore provocatively be put thus: Is the reasonable person a racist?
That is the standard analysis. I want to offer an alternative, which pro-
ceeds as follows. The choices we make at any moment in time, like the
be allowed to individualize the reasonable-person standard" and that this question is "per-
haps the greatest challenge to the present and coming generation of theorists ...." Paul H.
Robinson & Michael T Cahill, Law Without Justice: Why Criminal Law Doesn't Give
People What They Deserve 5i (2006). One possible explanation for this state of affairs may
be, as Larry Alexander famously argued, that any answer to the question as formulated is
bound to be "morally arbitrary." Larry Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship among
Voluntary Acts, Strict Liability, and Negligence in Criminal Law, 7 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y,
Spring I99o, at 84, 99. If so, then Peter Westen is doubtless correct when he says that the
question is the wrong one to be asking. See Peter Westen, Individualizing the Reasonable
Person in Criminal Law, Crim. L. & Phil. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript on file with
author) (arguing that the right question is: "'What would a person, who otherwise possessed
every trait of the actor but fully respected the interests that the statute at hand seeks to pro-
tect, have [believed] on the occasion at issue?'"); see also R.A. Duff, Choice, Character, and
Criminal Liability, 12 Law & Phil. 345, 359 (1993) ("[W]e should give the reasonable person
any of this defendant's actual characteristics ... other than [those] which involve or reveal
a lack of proper regard for the law and its values .. "). I agree with Westen that we are ask-
ing the wrong question, but my proposed replacement is different.
29. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law § 6.8, at 513 (1978) ("If the
reasonable person were defined to be just like the defendant in every respect, he would
arguably [believe and] do exactly what the defendant [believed and] did under the cir-
cumstances. Thus the standard of judgment collapses into a description of the particular
defendant."); Robinson & Cahill, supra note 28, at 50 ("[A] complete individualization of
the objective standard .. .would produce a purely subjective standard.").
One might argue that a fully subjective standard does not in fact eliminate the reason-
able-belief requirement altogether. The idea would be that under a fully subjective stan-
dard an actor's belief that p is a reasonable belief if the actor believes that p and at the same
time believes that it is reasonable to believe that p. Conversely, an actor's belief that p is an
unreasonable belief if the actor believes that p but at the same time believes that it is unrea-
sonable to believe that p. An actor in this latter epistemic state can be described as
epistemically akratic. He believes that p at the same time that he believes all things consid-
ered that he should not believe that p, just as a practically akratic actor performs an act at
the same time that he believes all things considered that he should not perform that act. A
debate exists as to whether this epistemic state is conceptually impossible or merely irrational.
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choice to kill, depend on the beliefs we possess at that moment. Our
choices, moreover, are up to us. We can choose or not as we see fit. In con-
trast, the beliefs we possess at any moment are not up to us. We can choose
to act or not act on our beliefs, but we cannot choose our beliefs. Thus,
although Goetz* did not choose to believe that p, he could have chosen
not to act on that belief. But the belief that p-I am about to be killed,
and deadly force is necessary to avoid being killed-is one that only a saint
or a fool would ignore. An actor who believes that he is about to be killed
could remain passive, but why should he? What good reason would he
have to do nothing? If no such reason is forthcoming, then I would argue
that self-defense should, all else being equal, be available to any actor who
killed because and only because he believed that doing so was necessary to
avoid being killed or seriously injured. Such an actor chooses to kill, but
from where he stands, he had no other choice, and where else could he
have stood?
Let me pause here in order to anticipate and attempt to disarm one like-
ly objection. A law of self-defense based exclusively on a defendant's honest
belief thatp would, so the objection goes, provide far too little protection to
those innocents who find themselves on the receiving end of the mistaken
defendant's deadly force. But is that true? It is hard to see how it could be.
The objection presupposes that an actor who is aware of the reasonable-
belief rule will not use deadly force if and when he believes that his belief
that p is unreasonable. That supposition in turn presupposes that an actor
can believe that p and at the same time believe that believing that p is
unreasonable (and presumably that he should therefore not believe that
p). 0 If that supposition is false, if an actor cannot believe that p and at the
same time believe that he should not believe thatp, then the reasonable-belief
Compare Jonathan E. Adler, Akratic Believing?, io Phil. Stud. i, 21 (2002) ("T]he first-
personal thought corresponding to the admission of akratic belief would be not merely
irrational, but incoherent."); David Owens, Epistemic Akrasia 85 Monist 381, 395 (2002)
(" [E]pistemic akrasia... is impossible."), with John Heil, Doxastic Incontinence, 93 Mind
56, 65 (1984) ("Doxastic incontinence is reprehensible, not because it holds out an unat-
tainable goal, but because it is at odds with what we take to be the aims of rational doxas-
tic agents."); Alfred R. Mele, Incontinent Believing, 36 Phil. Q. 212, 217 (1986) (arguing
that "full-blown incontinent believing" is "possible").
3o. An actor who finds himself in simultaneous possession of such beliefs might be said
to be suffering from "epistemic akrasia." For more on this idea, see supra note 29.
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rule is inert, exerting no influence on the behavior of an actor who believes
thatp.31 Consequently, a law of self-defense based on the reasonable-belief
rule would provide no greater protection to innocent victims than would
one based on honest belief alone.
Again, I claim that self-defense should be available, all else being
equal, to any actor who believes that p, including one like Goetz*.
Nonetheless, I make no argument here for abolishing the reasonable-
belief rule, for all else may not be equal. For example, imagine two
actors, each of whom believes that p. Imagine further that the second
actor, but not the first, believes that p only because he culpably violated
some other obligation with respect to which the state can legitimately
demand compliance. If so, then the law might elect to deny him, in
whole or in part, the claim of self-defense to which he would otherwise
have been entitled. Moreover, a belief formed as a result of such a viola-
tion might fairly be described as "unreasonable."" In other words, I sug-
gest (in part I) that the reasonable-belief rule should be portrayed as a
forfeiture rule: an actor who unreasonably believes that p forfeits, in
whole or in part, the claim of self-defense upon which he would other-
wise have been permitted to stand.
According to this line of thought, if Goetz* killed because and only
because he believed that he was about to be killed, and if the law nonethe-
less convicts him of murder, it does so because it holds him to have for-
feited his claim to self-defense, and it holds him to have forfeited that
claim because the only reason he believed that p was because he culpably
violated some other obligation with respect to which the law can legiti-
mately hold him to account. As such, whether Goetz* is guilty of murder,
or whether he should be acquitted on grounds of self-defense, depends on
whether any such obligation exists; and if so, whether that obligation is
one with respect to which the state can legitimately demand compliance;
and if so, whether Goetz* culpably violated it.
The purported unreasonableness of the real Goetz's belief that p
(assuming that he did indeed believe that p) is usually associated with the
31. See, e.g., Dressier, supra note 19, § 18.o4[A], at 2SI ("One who is threatened with
immediate death is not deterrable by the threat of criminal sanction. Therefore, his pun-
ishment is inefficacious.").
32. Conversely, a belief formed in the absence of any such violation might fairly be
described as "reasonable."
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idea that Goetz was a racist.33 Accordingly, I assume for present purposes
that Goetz* is a racist as well, and that he would not have believed that p
had he not been a racist. Consequently, if the victim had been white, Goetz*
would not have believed that he was about to be killed. 4 With those
assumptions in hand, at least three different theories can be offered to
explain why Goetz*'s belief that p was unreasonable, each of which iden-
tifies an obligation that Goetz* is assumed to have breached and upon
which the forfeiture of his self-defense claim is based. The pivotal question
is whether the respective obligation upon which each of these theories
rests is one the state can legitimately impose on its citizens.
33. Some evidence suggested the contrary. For example, according to an article written
in New York Magazine soon after the first grand jury declined to indict the real Goetz on
attempted-murder charges, Goetz's neighbor, Myra Friedman, wrote:
The other troubles of i4 th Street[, on which Goetz lived,] remained. People in the building
who had always considered themselves to be liberals began expressing some surprising senti-
ments. Bernie was one of these people. At a community meeting, I heard him say, "The only
way we're going to clean up this street is to get rid of the spics and niggers." I was shocked to
hear a man who I knew to have close black and Hispanic friends talk this way, and I said, "I'm
getting out of here." Later, somebody close to Bernie for many years suggested that he used an
occasional racial epithet just to shock.
Myra Friedman, My Neighbor Bernie Goetz, N.Y. Mag., Feb. I8, 1985, at 34, 35. George
Fletcher, who observed the proceedings against Goetz firsthand, concluded that "[w]e have
to accept the implication that at the time of [Goetz's] confession, at least, racial conscious-
ness and animosity did not weigh heavily in Goetz's mind." Fletcher, supra note i, at Zo5.
34. The assumption that race can make the difference between forming the belief that
p and not forming that belief is consistent with empirical studies showing that actors are
more apt to perceive a threat when, all else being equal, the putative assailant is black than
when he is white. See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using
Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychol. 1314, 1325 (2002) (noting that participants in a study "fired on an armed target
more quickly when he was African American than when he was White"); Charles M. Judd
et al., Automatic Stereotype vs. Automatic Prejudice: Sorting Out the Possibilities in the
Payne (2oo0) Weapon Paradigm, 40 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 75, 8o (2004) ("Black
faces seem to facilitate weapon identification compared to White faces."); B. Keith Payne,
Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes in
Misperceiving a Weapon, 8i J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 181, 182 (2001) ("[W]hen forced
to respond rapidly, racial cues may cause perceivers to make stereotype-consistent errors.");
B. Keith Payne et al., Best Laid Plans: Effects of Goals on Accessibility Bias and Cognitive
Control in Race-based Misperceptions of Weapons, 38 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 384,
394 (2oo2). The participants in one of the studies reported in Correll et al. "consist[ed]
of both Whites and African Americans." Correll et al., supra, at 1328. Corell and his
co-authors concluded that their "studies . . . suggest that Shooter Bias is present
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The first theory (discussed in part II) traces the unreasonableness of
Goetz*'s belief that p to his character. According to this character theory,
Goetz*'s belief thatp was unreasonable because he was a racist (and should
not have been), and his racism in turn caused him to form the belief that
p. This theory links the unreasonableness of Goetz*'s belief that p to the
fact that he violated an obligation not to possess a racist character. As a
result of that violation, he forfeits his claim of self-defense.
The second and third theories (discussed in part III) trace the unrea-
sonableness of Goetz*'s belief that p to a choice he made. According to the
belief-choice theory, Goetz*'s belief thatp was unreasonable because he chose
to believe that p and that choice was based on racism. This theory links the
unreasonableness of Goetz*'s belief that p to the fact that he violated an
obligation not to choose to believe that p, when that choice is based on
racism. As a result of that violation, he forfeits his claim of self-defense.
According to the character-choice theory, Goetz*'s belief that p was
unreasonable, not simply because he was a racist, nor because he chose to
believe that p, but rather because he chose to be or remain a racist. This
theory links the unreasonableness of Goetz*'s belief that p to the fact that
he violated an obligation not to choose to be or remain a racist, and his
being a racist in turn caused him to form the belief that p. As a result of
that violation, he forfeits his claim of self-defense.
I argue that while some states might be able to embrace one or more of
these theories, a liberal state can embrace none of them. In one way or
another each is inconsistent with the principle that an actor should be
punished, not for possessing or choosing to possess racist or otherwise
illiberal beliefs or desires, but only for choosing to cause (or risk causing)
harm when the law does not permit him to make such a choice.
Consequently, insofar as this principle is one to which a liberal state owes
allegiance, and insofar as our criminal law aspires to be a liberal criminal
law, Goetz* should be acquitted on grounds of self-defense, assuming once
again that when he pulled the trigger he honestly believed that he was
about to be killed. A liberal state should not, without more, punish a cit-
izen for choosing to kill when and because he honestly believes he is about
to be killed. If acquitting Goetz* on grounds of self-defense is thought to
among White college students ... and among a community sample that consists of both
Whites and African-Americans .. " Id. The other studies cited above included only non-
black participants.
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be the wrong result, a liberal state nonetheless has little choice but to
accept it, unless it wishes to abandon the above-mentioned principle, or
until some other theory of unreasonableness consistent with that principle
can be identified and defended."
I. THE REASONABLE-BELIEF RULE
As a general proposition an actor who uses deadly force against another
should be acquitted on grounds of self-defense if he reasonably believed
that the use of such force was necessary to prevent his death or serious
bodily injury.6 In some jurisdictions the actor must also have reasonably
35. I make no daim that the theories examined here exhaust all the possibilities. What
I mainly hope to accomplish is to place the argumentative burden of proof on those who
believe that Goetz* can be punished consistent with the principle mentioned in the text.
36. The Model Penal Code requires that the actor's use of force be "immediately neces-
sary" Model Penal Code § 3.04(l) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). No jurisdiction that I know
of specifies how probable an actor must reasonably believe a lethal attack to be before he is
permitted to use deadly force to preempt it. In other words, no statute defining self-defense
says, for example, that an actor must reasonably believe that the probability of death or seri-
ous bodily injury is 75 percent before the actor can respond with deadly force. Likewise, no
jurisdiction specifies how confident an actor must be in his belief that death or serious bodily
injury is imminent before he is permitted to use deadly force. For present purposes, I will
assume that an actor must have whatever measure of confidence is needed in order to say that
his cognitive attitude toward p qualifies as a belief, and not merely a suspicion. If an actor
merely suspects thatp, then he probably should not be permitted to use deadly force. See Boaz
Sangero, Self-Defence in Criminal Law 287-88 (2oo6) ("A situation could exist in which the
actor is not sure whether he is being attacked or not. In such a situation there is good reason
to require that he explore and verify the situation prior to using defensive force.").
Mark Kelman and Jody Armour nonetheless propose that an actor should be entitled to
self-defense if and only if the error costs associated with a false positive (i.e., believing one is
about to be attacked when one is not about to be attacked) are less than those associated with
a false negative (i.e., believing one is not about to be attacked when one is about to be
attacked). See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur. Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent
Baysians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 781, 794-95 (1994); Mark Kelman,
Reasonable Evidence of Reasonableness, 17 Critical Inquiry 798, 815-16 (t99I). For example,
suppose at the moment he pulled the trigger that Goetz* believed that the probability of him
being killed (unless he killed first) was 75 percent. According to the Kelman-Armour thesis,
Goetz* should not, despite his belief, be acquitted on grounds of self-defense if a jury decides
that the false-negative error costs associated with requiring him to wait are less than the false-
positive error costs associated with permitting him to kill. Moreover, while the false-negative
error costs are limited more or less to Goetz's death, the false-positive error costs are not lim-
ited to the death of the innocent victim. Inasmuch as Goetz* "selected [his victims] on the
basis of their race," Kelman, supra, at 815, those costs also include the stigmatization of
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believed that his assailant's use of such force was imminent. 7 If an actor's
beliefs regarding the elements of the defense were indeed reasonable,38 he
remains entitled to the defense even if it turns out later that he was wrong
to believe that he was about to be attacked.
young black men and their consequent exclusion from full participation in public life. See
id. at 816. Thus, despite his belief that the chance of him being killed unless he killed first
was 75 percent, the law should demand that Goetz* wait until he believed that the chance
was even higher, though how much higher is unclear.
This theory may be an attractive proposal for reforming self-defense law. It may even be an
accurate description of how jurors actually go about deciding cases of self-defense. But it is not
an accurate statement of the law of self-defense. The law of self-defense (generally speaking)
permits an actor to use deadly force when he reasonably believes that the use of such force is
necessary to prevent him from being killed or seriously injured. In contrast, the Kelman-
Armour proposal would permit an actor to use deadly force if and only if, given the actor's
belief that the probability that he will be killed or seriously injured (unless he kills first) is 0,
the false-positive error costs of killing are less than the false-negative error costs of waiting. This
proposal asks the jury to assess not the reasonableness of the actor's belief, but the reasonable-
ness of his action in light of his beliefs. See id. at 8oo (arguing that "although the stated norm
in self-defense cases [i.e., the law of self-defense] makes reference only to the reasonableness of
the defendant's factual perceptions, we in fact also expect the jury to judge the reasonableness
of his decision to use deadly force, and that two defendants facing an equal chance of griev-
ous bodily harm or death may not and should not always be judged to be acting equally rea-
sonably in doing so"). Moreover, existing doctrine is already designed to make sure that an
actor's use of deadly force is reasonable, at least in the sense that it is proportional. An actor
can only use deadly force to defend against deadly force. He cannot use deadly force against
nondeadly force, even when the use of deadly force is necessary to avoid nondeadly injury.
37. See, e.g., Dressier, supra note 19, § iS8.oz[D][i], at 246-48. One can imagine cases
in which an actor reasonably believes that he is facing imminent death or serious bodily
injury but nonetheless unreasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to
avoid such death or injury. If some measure of force less than that of deadly force would
suffice to avoid an imminent threat of death or serious injury, then the actor is not per-
mitted to resort to deadly force. He is only permitted to use the lesser force needed to avoid
the threat. See, e.g., id., § 18.o2[C], at 238.
For arguments in favor of eliminating the imminence requirement from the law of self-
defense, see 2 Robinson, supra note 19, § 131(c)(I), at 78 ("The proper inquiry is not the
immediacy of the threat but the immediacy of the response necessary in defense.");
Richard Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71
N.C.L. Rev. 371, 38o (1993) ("Because imminence serves only to further the necessity prin-
ciple, if there is a conflict between imminence and necessity, necessity must prevail."). But
see Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Defending Imminence: From Battered Women to Iraq, 46
Ariz. L. Rev. 213, 217 (2004) (defending the imminence requirement on the grounds that
"[i]mminence serves as the actus reus for aggression, separating those threats that we may
properly defend against from mere inchoate and potential threats").
38. The Model Penal Code's self-defense provision does not speak in terms of "reasonable"
or "unreasonable" beliefs. See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law § 4.4, at 263-64 (1997)
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Most everyone agrees that an actor who uses deadly force when he rea-
sonably and correctly believed that p is properly characterized as having
been justified in using such force. 9 At the very least, the law permits him
to use such force. In contrast, how best to characterize an actor who uses
deadly force when he reasonably but incorrectly believed that p is a matter
(describing differences between common law and MPC approaches to mistakes generally).
Instead, the code's self-defense provision says that an actor is permitted to use deadly force if
he believes-reasonably or otherwise-that the use of such force is "necessary to protect him-
self against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force
or threat .. " Model Penal Code § 3 .o4 (2)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Standing
alone, this provision would mean that an actor is entitled to an acquittal on grounds of self-
defense if he honestly believed that the use of deadly force was necessary to protect himself
against the itemized harms, no matter how unreasonable that belief might be.
But another section of the code qualifies this provision, such that if an actor is "reckless
or negligent in having such belief or in acquiring or failing to acquire any knowledge or
belief which is material to the justifiability of his use of force, the justification afforded by
[the self-defense provision] is unavailable in a prosecution for an offense for which reckless-
ness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability." Id. § 3.09(2). This
provision is usually understood to mean that an actor who recklessly believes that the use of
deadly force is immediately necessary can, for example, raise the defense with respect to a
charge of murder (for which recklessness does not suffice for liability), but not with respect
to a charge of manslaughter (for which recklessness does suffice); likewise, an actor who neg-
ligently believes that the use of deadly force is immediately necessary can raise the defense
with respect to a charge of murder or manslaughter (for which negligence does not suffice),
but not with respect to a charge of negligent homicide (for which negligence does suffice).
The code's approach has the virtue of trying to align the culpability associated with an
actor's mistaken belief in the need to use deadly force with the offense for which he is ulti-
mately held liable. A reckless mistake gets you reckless homicide; a negligent mistake gets
you negligent homicide. Nonetheless, one problem with this approach (among others) is its
reliance on the idea of a "reckless belief." What does it mean to call a belief "reckless"?
According to one view, an actor who recklessly believes that p is one who believes that p
but at the same time suspects that not-p. See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender,
Wilful Ignorance, Knowledge, and the "Equal Culpability" Thesis: A Study of the Deeper
Significance of the Principle of Legality, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 29, 41-42. Despite his belief that
p, the actor's suspicion that not-p might provide the basis for requiring him to act to gather
additional evidence, or simply to wait to acquire additional evidence, that would confirm his
suspicion. According to another view, an actor who recklessly believes that p is one who
believes that p while at the same time believing that he should believe that not-p. See, e.g.,
Larry Alexander, Lesser Evils: A Closer Look at the Paradigmatic Justification, 24 Law & Phil.
611, 624-25 (2005). This approach treats an actor who recklessly believes that p as someone
suffering from epistemic akrasia. See supra note 29. For present purposes, I will continue to
speak in the more familiar common-law terminology of reasonable and unreasonable belief
39. According to one writer, self-defense is always an excuse. See Claire 0. Finkelstein,
Self-Defense As a Rational Excuse, 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 621, 643-44 (1996). According to
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of considerable controversy. Some argue that such an actor, like the actor
who reasonably and correctly believes that p, is justified in using deadly
force. 0 Self-defense is therefore always a justification: An actor who kills
because he reasonably believes that he is about to be killed has done noth-
ing that the law does not permit him to do, whether his belief turns out
to be correct or not.
Others argue that such an actor's use of deadly force is excused, but not
justified: The law does not permit him to kill if as a matter of fact he was
not about to be killed, despite his reasonable belief that he was about to be
killed. Nonetheless, it withholds condemnation because his reasonable mis-
take makes it inappropriate to blame him for what he has done, even though
it remains true that he should not have done it.41 Thus, self-defense is some-
times a justification; sometimes an excuse. It all depends on whether the
actor's reasonable belief turns out to be true (justification) or not (excuse).
Likewise, nearly everyone agrees that an actor who unreasonably believes
that p is neither justified nor (fully) excused.42 In some jurisdictions,
another, the entire excuse-justification debate is misguided inasmuch as the "restrictive
schema of 'justification' and 'excuse' forces theorists to choose between just two alternative
classifications, neither of which is satisfactory." R.A. Duff, Rethinking Justifications, 39
Tulsa L. Rev. 829, 838 (2004). Duff does not "discuss cases in which the actor's beliefs are
unreasonable .. " Id. at 838 n.25.
40. See, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law 199 (1999); Victor
Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 291 (2005); Marcia Baron, Justifications and Excuses, 2 Ohio
St. J. Crim. L. 387, 387 (2005); Mitchell N. Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and
Morality, 53 Duke L.J. 1, 56 (2003); Russell L. Christopher, Mistake of Fact in the Objective
Theory of Justification: Do Two Rights Make Two Wrongs Make Two Rights ... ?, 85 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 295, 331 (1995); Joshua Dressier, New Thoughts About the Concept
of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking, 32
UCLA L. Rev. 61, 93 (1985); Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and
Excuse, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1897, 1903 (984); Kenneth W Simons, Self-Defense: Reasonable
Beliefs or Reasonable Self-Control?, iX New Crim. L. Rev. 51, 65 (20o8); Hamish Stewart, The
Role of Reasonableness in Self-Defense, 16 Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence. 317, 336 (2003).
4I. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 29, § 1O.1.2, at 766; Larry Alexander, A Unified Excuse
of Preemptive Self-Protection, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1475, 1483-84 (1999); John Gardner,
Justifications and Reasons, in Harm and Culpability 103, 105 (A.P. Simester & A.TH. Smith
eds., 1996); Heidi M. Hurd, Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpability, 74
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1551, 1564 (1999); Paul Robinson, Competing Theories of Justification:
Deeds v. Reasons, in Harm and Culpability, supra, at 45, 47; Paul H. Robinson, Criminal
Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 199, 239-40 (1982).
42. For claims contrary to this consensus, see Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The
General Part § 73, at 209 (2d ed. 1961) ("If a man inflicts injury on another in the unreasonable
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induding New York, such an actor would have no claim of self-defense to
any charge. If charged with murder, he would be convicted of murder. In
other jurisdictions, such an actor would have a defense to some charges,
but not to others. If charged with murder, he would have a defense. But if
charged with manslaughter, he would have none. Because his belief that p
was unreasonable, the defense to which he is entitled is "imperfect."" It
constitutes a partial defense only. It does not result in an acquittal, but
instead mitigates to manslaughter what would otherwise be murder.
The account developed here is similar to the doctrine of imperfect self-
defense, but also different. According to the imperfect self-defense doc-
trine, or at least one prominent version of it, an actor who believes thatp,
but who unreasonably so believes, will be acquitted of murder, but con-
victed of voluntary manslaughter. Consequently, the doctrine is usually
portrayed as mitigating murder to manslaughter.' The defendant is (really)
guilty of murder, but the law reduces the crime from a greater one to a
lesser one. Moreover, the mitigation the defense affords remains the same
(murder to manslaughter), no matter why the actor's belief that p was
unreasonable.
In contrast, on the account developed here, an actor who believes that
p should, all else being equal, be acquitted on grounds of self-defense. He
should be excused. He has in fact acted impermissibly, but he is not
blameworthy. Looking at the world through his eyes, he has at the
moment he kills done nothing that the law itself would not have permit-
ted him to do. Nonetheless, he loses that defense if he believed thatp only
because he culpably violated some other obligation with respect to which
belief that he has to do so in self-defence, the injury must be borne philosophically as an
accident .... If this is so, why should the position be any different where the act of sup-
posed self-defense results in death?"); Singer, supra note 22, at 461 (concluding that the
"subjective test is preferable to the objective rule [i.e., the reasonable-belief rule] courts
embraced in the nineteenth century").
43. See, e.g., Dressier, supra note 19, § I8.03, at 249; LaFave, supra note I9, § 5 .7 (i), at
500-o. At least one study finds that most people, given a choice, would choose to make
an unreasonably mistaken actor's liability proportionate to the culpability associated with
his mistake. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Testing Competing Theories of
Justification, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1095, 1128 (1998).
44. See, e.g., Dressier, supra note i9, § 18.03, at z49-50 (noting that imperfect self-
defense mitigates culpability); Robinson, supra note 38, § 8.5, at 460 (noting that MPC
version of imperfect self-defense mitigates degree of liability).
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the state can legitimately demand compliance. Thus, whereas the doctrine
of imperfect self-defense treats an honest (but unreasonable) belief as mit-
igating, the account developed here treats an unreasonable (but honest)
belief as aggravating. Moreover, whereas the doctrine of imperfect self-
defense provides a one-size-fits-all mitigation, the account developed here
would ideally tailor the extent of the forfeiture to match the seriousness of
the prior breach. Relatively more serious breaches should result in more
extensive forfeitures (and more extensive liability), and vice versa.
Let me begin the development of this account with a more general dis-
cussion of the role forfeiture rules play in the criminal law.
A. Forfeiture Rules
Criminal law defenses like self-defense often come with strings attached.
These strings take the form of forfeiture rules. Under these rules an actor
forfeits a defense to which he would otherwise have been entitled if he cul-
pably chooses to act or not act at time t, which act or omission is the but-
for and proximate cause of his being subject at time t2 to the type of threat
associated with the relevant defense. 5 The general idea behind such rules
is that an actor who culpably chooses to create or encounter a threat,
whether that threat comes from man or nature, should not be allowed to
point to that threat if, should the threat come to pass, he is forced to com-
mit a crime in order to avoid it. He forfeits (in full or in part) any excuse
45. See, e.g., 2 Robinson, supra note 19, § 123(a), at 30 ("[Aill jurisdictions with law on
this point take into account the actor's culpability in causing or contributing to the justi-
fying circumstances, and limit the availability of the justification defenses."); id. § 162(a),
at 247 (noting that although "the problem of an actor causing his disability or condition
most frequently arises in cases involving intoxication ... [t]here is no reason ... why such
a circumstance should not be taken into account for all excuses").
Some forfeiture rules are based, not on the actor's culpable choice to encounter a threat,
but instead on his negligent encountering of it. For example, under the Model Penal Code
an actor who "was negligent in placing himself in ... a situation [in which it was proba-
ble that he would be subjected to duress]" forfeits any claim of duress "whenever negli-
gence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged." Model Penal Code § 2.09(2)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962). Because I believe that negligence is a controversial basis
upon which to premise a forfeiture rule, I set aside such negligence-based rules for present
purposes. I believe that negligence is a controversial basis upon which to premise a forfei-
ture rule because I believe that negligence is (most often) an illegitimate basis upon which
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or justification to which he would otherwise have been entitled based on
his choice to create or encounter the threat in the first place. He violates
a duty against culpably choosing to create or encounter threats, and the
price he pays for that choice is to lose (in full or in part) a defense to which
he would otherwise have been entitled.
The so-called "aggressor rule" associated with self-defense is a good
example. According to the Model Penal Code's formulation, an actor who
"provoke[s] the use of force against himself in the same encounter"4 6 for-
feits any claim of self-defense to which he might otherwise have been enti-
tled, provided that he provoked the use of such force against himself "with
the purpose of causing death or serious bodily injury."47 In other words, if
you throw a punch in order to provoke someone to try to kill you so that
you can kill him first, and if he does try to kill you, you cannot claim self-
defense if you kill him before he kills you. You are the initial aggressor, and
as such you forfeit your right to self-defense, which you can regain only if
you renounce your initial aggression.
Similar forfeiture rules often accompany the defenses of necessity and
duress.48 For example, the Model Penal Code provides that an actor who
commits a crime under duress, and who would therefore otherwise have a
valid defense to the crime charged, forfeits that defense if he "recklessly
placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be
to premise retributive punishment, and forfeiture rules end up imposing retributive pun-
ishment for the act or omission forming the basis for the forfeiture.
46. Model Penal Code § 3.o 4 (2)(b)(i) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
47. Id. The real Goetz would not have lost his claim of self-defense under this provi-
sion. Even if he did in fact do something to "provoke the use of force against himself,"
nothing in the available facts suggests that he did so with the "purpose of causing death or
serious bodily injury." I assume, for example, that even if Goetz's choice to sit close to the
four youths provoked (i.e., was a but-for cause of) their use of force against him, Goetz did
not make that choice in order to cause death or serious bodily injury to the victims. The
result might be different under broader (and therefore more controversial) formulations of
the aggressor rule.
48. Forfeiture rules are for some reason seldom attached to insanity-defense provisions.
See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in
the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 Va. L. Rev. I, 24 & n.85 (1985) (iden-
tifying only two states whose penal codes deny an actor an insanity defense when the actor
culpably chooses to cause his own insanity). Although an actor may bear no responsibility
for being mentally diseased or defective, he may nonetheless bear some responsibility under
some circumstances if he permits his mental disease or defect to cause the cognitive
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subjected to duress." 9 Thus, an actor who joins a crime-committing gang
and then finds himself forced to commit a crime cannot claim duress as a
defense inasmuch as he culpably chose to place himself in the situation
giving rise to the duress. Much the same goes for necessity.50 Under rules
of this type, an actor forfeits a defense to which he would otherwise have
been entitled if and because he culpably impairs his situation. He chooses
to get himself into trouble.
The voluntary-intoxication rule is another type of forfeiture rule.5
Getting drunk, like starting a fight or joining a gang, can cost an actor a
defense to which he would otherwise have been entitled. For example, if
an actor unwittingly creates an unjustified risk of causing someone's death,
or volitional incapacity associated with traditional tests of insanity; for example, choosing
not to take medicine he knows that he needs to take in order to control the effects of his
disorder. See, e.g., Michael D. Slodov, Note, Criminal Responsibility and the Noncompliant
Psychiatric Offender: Risking Madness, 40 Case W Res. L. Rev. 270, 274 (1990) (arguing
that "in some circumstances, imposing responsibility on the noncompliant mentally ill
offender is consistent with the aims of criminal law and with accepted principles of crim-
inal responsibility").
49. Model Penal Code § 2.09(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The defense is forfeited
completely if the actor recklessly placed himself in such a situation (and presumably if he
does so purposely or knowingly as well), but only partially if the actor negligently places
himself in such a situation. See id.
50. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 3.02(2) ("When the actor was reckless or negligent
in bringing about the situation requiring a choice of harms or evils. . . , the justification
afforded by this Section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which reck-
lessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability."). An actor who
purposely or knowingly brought about the situation requiring such a choice would pre-
sumably lose the defense altogether.
51. This rule is sometimes characterized as an evidentiary rule and sometimes as a sub-
stantive rule. Take the case of a drunken defendant who unwittingly kills someone and is
charged with reckless homicide, which requires awareness of the lethal risk his conduct is
creating. Characterizing the voluntary-intoxication rule as an evidentiary rule would mean
that the state is required to prove that the defendant realized that he was creating a lethal
risk, but that the defendant is prevented from introducing intoxication evidence designed
to show that he lacked the requisite awareness. Characterizing the rule as a substantive rule
would mean that the state is not required to prove the requisite awareness. Instead, it
would mean that the state believes that getting drunk and unwittingly causing death is just
as serious as the crime of reckless homicide (consciously imposing an unjustified lethal risk
with death resulting). Compare Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 41 (1996) (plurality opinion)
(characterizing the Montana voluntary-intoxication rule at issue in the case as a rule of
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and someone gets killed, he is not guilty of reckless homicide, because
reckless homicide requires the state to prove that he was aware of the lethal
risk he was creating. But if the reason the actor failed to realize that he was
creating a lethal risk is because he got himself drunk, then he is out of
luck. Though he was not in fact reckless, the law treats him as if he was.5 2
He chose to drink, and unlucky for him, he happened to kill someone
while intoxicated, even though he never realized that he was exposing any-
one to a risk of death. Under the voluntary-intoxication rule an actor for-
feits a defense to which he would otherwise have been entitled if and
because he culpably impairs his mind through intoxicants. He chooses to
become unaware."
Forfeiture rules are objectionable because they convict and punish an
actor for a crime he did not commit or to which he would otherwise have
evidence excluding evidence of the effects of voluntary intoxication), with id. at 57
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (characterizing the rule as a substantive rule redefining the mental-
state element of the offense charged). See also Peter Westen, Egelhoff Again, 36 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 1203, 1215-27 (1999) (describing these two approaches).
Some jurisdictions treat mental-illness evidence in a manner analogous to voluntary-
intoxication evidence. In these jurisdictions mental-illness evidence can be introduced to
show that the defendant was insane, but it cannot be introduced to show that he lacked a
mental state associated with the crime charged. See Dressier, supra note I9, § 26.02[B] [4],
at 397-98. Although this mental-illness rule may be defended on a variety of evidentiary
grounds, see, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2734-36 (2oo6), it would be harder
to defend on substantive grounds. Treating a voluntarily intoxicated actor as if he possessed
a mental state he did not in fact possess is one thing: A voluntarily intoxicated actor is at
least responsible for becoming intoxicated. Treating a mentally ill actor as if he possessed a
mental state he did not in fact possess is another: A mentally ill actor is ordinarily respon-
sible neither for becoming mentally ill nor for the behavioral manifestations of his illness.
52. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.o8 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). For three slightly
different interpretations of § 2.o8, see Westen, supra note 51, at 1220 n.72. A voluntarily
intoxicated actor would still have a failure-of-proof defense to a charge of purposeful or
knowing homicide (denominated murder) under the MPC. Less clear is whether the actor
would continue to have such a defense to a charge of reckless homicide under circum-
stances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life (also denominated
murder).
53. Opponents of the voluntary-intoxication rule have proposed a separate crime of
"being drunk and dangerous" for which "conviction . . . should usually result in purely
remedial treatment... [and] could even result in punishment if the accused, knowing from
previous experience that he is dangerous when in liquor, continues to take it." Williams,
supra note 42, § 183, at 573-74.
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had a valid defense. The "crime" the actor actually committed was that
associated with his prior culpable choice: joining a gang, getting drunk,
and so forth. The punishment the actor deserves is whatever punishment
(if any) is deserved for making that choice. The actor who joins a crimi-
nal gang, hoping or believing he will or might later be coerced into com-
mitting a robbery, should be punished for choosing to join the gang with
those attendant mental states, not for the robbery he committed under
duress. The actor who gets drunk and unwittingly kills someone should be
punished for getting drunk and unwittingly causing death, not for reck-
less homicide. Actors should be punished for the crimes they commit, and
the punishment they receive should fit the crime. But forfeiture rules
result in actors being punished for crimes they did not commit, and as
such, forfeiture rules result in disproportionate punishment, though how
disproportionate will of course depend on the facts.
Nonetheless, my goal here is not to criticize forfeiture rules, nor urge
that they be banished from the criminal law. 4 Instead, I want to urge that
the reasonable-belief rule of self-defense is fairly portrayed as a forfeiture
rule, and that a liberal state cannot legitimately apply this rule in cases like
that of Goetz*.
B. The Reasonable-Belief Rule As a Forfeiture Rule
Although the reasonable-belief rule is not usually portrayed as a forfeiture
rule, it seems to me that it can fairly be so portrayed. The reasonable-belief
rule is like the voluntary-intoxication rule inasmuch as both involve an
impairment of the actor's mind. The intoxicated actor's impairment takes
the form of ignorance: He fails to form a belief that he should have
formed, and but for his intoxication would have formed. He fails to see
something that he should have seen. The unreasonably believing actor's
impairment takes the form of a mistake: He forms a belief that he should
not have formed, and but for some prior breach of duty, would not have
formed. He sees something that he should not have seen.
A voluntarily intoxicated actor forfeits a defense because he chose to get
drunk. An unreasonably believing actor forfeits a defense because he unrea-
sonably believes, and in the case of Goetz*, because he unreasonably believes
54. See Robinson, supra note 48, at 28-29.
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thatp 5 But what does it mean to say that Goetz* unreasonably believes that
p? What is the something that provides the basis upon which he forfeits his
claim of self-defense? If Goetz*'s belief thatp was unreasonable, such that he
forfeits his claim to self-defense, why was it unreasonable? In order to answer
that question, we need a better sense of what was going on in Goetz*'s head
at the moment he pulled the trigger. What was he thinking?
Here is one account. We are assuming that at some point during the fatal
encounter, Goetz* formed the belief that his life was in imminent danger,
which belief may or may not have had any thought preceding it. That belief
was a belief about the world: a belief about what is the case. That belief in
turn caused, or may have caused, Goetz* to think about what he ought to
do. He then formed another pair of beliefs: that he ought to save himself
from his assailant's imminent attack, and that in order to do so he ought to
kill his assailant. These beliefs are practical judgments: beliefs about what
one ought to do. At that point, consistent with his judgment as to what he
ought to do, Goetz* chose to kill his assailant, thereby causing himself to
form the intent to kill. He then chose to execute that intention, resulting in
the formation of a volition, which in turn caused his finger to move and the
trigger to be pulled. The rest was up to the laws of nature.
The belief that sets this sequence in motion is the belief that p. Yet that
belief, like any other belief an actor forms at any given moment, depends on
the evidence available to him at that moment, as well as on his cognitive
capacities at that moment. For present purposes, I assume that nothing was
wrong with Goetz*'s cognitive capacities. As such, I assume that his forma-
tion of the belief that p was not due to anything that could fairly be charac-
terized as a defect in cognitive capacity or mental disorder, such as "racial
paranoia."5 Instead, I assume that the problem was with his evidence. The
problem, one might say, was not with Goetz*'s cognitive hardware, but with
55. One might argue that an actor subject to the reasonable-belief rule would not oth-
erwise have a valid defense, whereas an actor subject to the voluntary-intoxication rule
would. An actor who kills because he unreasonably believes that he is about to be killed
does not have a valid self-defense claim, so the argument goes, because a valid self-defense
claim requires his belief to be reasonable. But this argument would seem to beg the ques-
tion. It simply presupposes that the reasonable-belief rule is somehow intrinsic to the
defense itself when the rule can also be portrayed as a forfeiture rule extrinsic to it.
56. I assume that Goetz* did not believe that p just because he believed that his puta-
tive assailants were black: that would be paranoid. Cf. American Psychiatric Association,
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his software. Finally, I will assume that the evidence available to Goetz* at
the moment he formed the belief thatp consisted of all the other beliefs he
possessed at that moment. Call these beliefs his background beliefs: beliefs
he possessed at the moment he formed the belief that p and but for which
he would not have formed the belief that p.
Goetz*'s background beliefs no doubt included beliefs related to the
victim's movements or gestures, his request or demand for five dollars, the
tone of his voice, the look in his eye, the tight confines of the subway car,
and so forth. None of these beliefs is thought to be particularly objec-
tionable. They are legitimate grounds upon which anyone might form the
belief that p. We can also assume that Goetz*'s background beliefs includ-
ed two other beliefs: that males are more prone to violence than females; and
that the young are more prone to violence than the old. These beliefs are of
course generalizations.57 Even so, I doubt that many people would consider
them illegitimate bases upon which one might form the belief that p.
If all these background beliefs were jointly sufficient to have caused
Goetz* to form the belief that p, then the case would be far less interest-
ing than it would be if they were insufficient. What makes the case inter-
esting is the assumption that Goetz* believed that p because and only
because his network of background beliefs included another generaliza-
tion: blacks are more prone to violence than nonblacks, or some proposi-
tion along those lines. Call this belief the belief that q. I will assume that
this belief was necessary to Goetz*'s formation of the belief thatp, and that
it, together with his other background beliefs, were sufficient to cause him
to form the belief that p. Goetz*'s possession of the belief that q is usually
what leads to his characterization as a racist, and inasmuch as his racism
consisted in his possession of that belief, Goetz*'s racism was cognitive.5"
It was, so to speak, in his head.
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 69o (4th ed., textual rev. 2000)
("Individuals with [paranoid personality] disorder assume that other people will exploit,
harm, or deceive them, even if no evidence exists to support this expectation ... ").
57. In fact all of his relevant background beliefs are generalizations, i.e., people who
make gestures like the gestures the victim made are more prone to violence; people who
make requests or demands for money are more prone to violence; and so forth.
58. See, e.g., Kwane Anthony Appiah, Racisms, in Anatomy of Racism 3, 5 (David Theo
Goldberg ed., i99o) ("[Elxtrinsic racists make moral distinctions between members of dif-
ferent races because they believe that racial essence entails certain morally relevant qualities.").
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Commentary on the real Goetz case tends to suggest that Goetz*'s racism
was indeed cognitive."s Goetz* was a racist because he believed that q. But
there is another possibility. Goetz*'s racism may not have been in his head,
but in his heart. In other words, his racism was conative, 6° not cognitive.6'
Conative racism can be a matter of hostility, ill will animus, malice, and
so forth, in which case the actor wants members of the stigmatized group
to suffer some disadvantage or bear some burden,62 just because they are
members of the stigmatized group; or it can be a matter of indifference, in
which case the actor cares not at all, or less than he should, for the well-
being or fate of the group's members.63 Call this desire, or relative lack
59. See, e.g., Armour, supra note 36, at 782 (racism consists in the actor's belief that
"blacks are more prone than whites to be criminals"); Kelman, supra note 36, at 812 (racism
consists in the actor's beliefs "about the criminal predilections of black teenagers").
6o. See, e.g., J.L.A. Garcia, The Heart of Racism, 27 J. Soc. Phil. 5, 6 (1996) ("Racism
... is something that essentially involves not our beliefs and their rationality or irra-
tionality, but our wants, intentions, likes and dislikes .. ") [hereinafter Garcia, Heart of
Racism]. Garcia has defended this account against competitors in subsequent work. See,
e.g., J.L.A. Garcia, Current Conceptions of Racism: A Critical Examination of Some
Recent Social Philosophy, 28 J. Soc. Phil. 5 (i997); J.L.A. Garcia, Philosophical Analysis
and the Moral Concept of Racism, 25 Phil. & Soc. Criticism i (i999); J.L.A. Garcia,
Racism and Racial Discourse, 32 Phil. E 125 (2ooi). For criticism of Garcia's conative con-
ception of racism, see, e.g., Charles W Mills, "Heart" Attack: A Critique of Jorge Garcia's
Volitional Conception of Racism, 7 J. Ethics 29, 44 (2003) ("An account of racism which
just focuses on feelings without an examination of their accompanying beliefs is not going
to work because we need to know what beliefs ground the feelings in order to adjudicate
whether they are racist or not."); Tommie Shelby, Is Racism in the "Heart"?, 33 J. Soc.
Phil. 4i, 414 (2oo2) (arguing that racist "beliefs are essential to and even sufficient for
racism").
61. For another take on the distinction between cognitive and conative racism, see
Lawrence Blum, "I'm Not a Racist, But...": The Moral Quandary of Race 8 (2002) (dis-
tinguishing between "inferiorization" (cognitive) and "antipathy" (conative) racism).
6z. See, e.g., Garcia, Heart of Racism, supra note 6o, at 6 ("In its central and most
vicious form, [racism] is a hatred, ill-will, directed against a person or persons on account
of their assigned race.").
63. See, e.g., id. ("In a derivative form, one is a racist when one either does not care at
all or does not care enough (i.e, as much as morality requires) or does not care in the right
ways about people assigned to a certain racial group, where this disregard is based on racial
classification.").
A number of criminal-law scholars have argued that indifference, whether race-based
or otherwise, does and should play an important role in criminal-law theory and doctrine.
For example, they have argued that an actor who creates a risk of causing a prohibited
harm, but who does so unwittingly, can still fairly be subject to retributive punishment if
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of desire, the desire that q.' Cognitive racism and conative racism may go
hand in hand. Racial animus may cause an actor to hold a racist belief
(which explains why such beliefs tend to be impervious to countervail-
ing evidence); and racial beliefs may cause an actor to harbor racial ani-
mus. But they can also travel separately. An actor might believe that
blacks are more violent than nonblacks without harboring any malice
toward them; or he might harbor malice toward them without possessing
his lack of awareness was due to indifference to the well-being of others. See, e.g., R.A.
Duff, Intention, Agency, and Criminal Liability i57 (990) (Culpable negligence is
"essentially a matter... of a kind of'practical indifference."'); Mayo Moran, Rethinking
the Reasonable Person: An Egalitarian Reconstruction of the Objective Standard 258
(2003) ("[T]he indifference account places its focus on the attitude displayed by any par-
ticular action .. "); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Judging Evil: Rethinking the Law of Murder
and Manslaughter 171 (1998) ("Where the accused did not perceive the risks involved at
the time of his conduct, culpability rests on a judgment about why the person failed to
perceive."); Jeremy Horder, Gross Negligence and Criminal Culpability, 47 U. Toronto
L.J. 495, 501 (1997) ("The subjective element in indifference lies ... in an uncaring atti-
tude toward the victim's relevant protected interests."); Samuel Pillsbury, Crimes of
Indifference, 49 Rutgers L. Rev. IO5, ISt (1996) ("The key to culpability for failure to per-
ceive is why the person failed to perceive."); Kenneth W Simons, Does Punishment for
"Culpable Indifference" Simply Punish for "Bad Character"?: Examining the Requisite
Connection Between Mens Rea and Actus Reus, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 219, 264 (2002)
(One "possible culpable indifference standard ... asks what the actor would have done
if he had had a different belief about the relevant risks."); Kenneth W. Simons,
Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 463, 487 (1992) ("[R]eckless indifference ...
[means] caring much less about the result than the actor should."); Kenneth W Simons,
Culpability and Retributive Theory: The Problem of Criminal Negligence, 5 J.
Contemp. Legal Issues 365, 388 (1994) ("Culpable indifference ... is a desire-state reflect-
ing the actor's grossly insufficient concern for the interests of others."); Victor Tadros,
Recklessness and the Duty to Take Care, in Criminal Law Theory 227, 229 (Stephen
Shute & A.R Simester eds., 2001) (arguing that criminal liability for negligence is not
warranted unless the "defendant's action is a manifestation of one of a narrow range of
vices: primarily, vices that show that the defendant has insufficient regard for the inter-
ests of others"). For criticism of this line of thought, see, e.g., Larry Alexander,
Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 Cal. L. Rev.
931, 938 (2000); Stephen P Garvey, What's Wrong With Involuntary Manslaughter?, 85
Tex. L. Rev. 333, 357-63 (zoo6).
64. Describing an actor who is indifferent to the well-being of blacks as possessing
the desire that q is of course not quite right. It would be more precise to say that he lacks
sufficient desire to treat blacks with the equal concern and respect to which everyone is
entitled.
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any belief or set of beliefs that might rationalize or make sense of such a
sentiment.65
The important point for now is that the beliefs an actor forms at any
moment in time depend not only on the background beliefs he possesses
at that moment, but also on the background desires he possesses. When
some desire other than the desire to discover the truth and avoid error
influences what an actor believes, we might describe the actor as self-
deceived, or say that his belief is the product of wishful thinking.
6
Indeed, we use such labels in order to capture the causal power desire
can have on belief formation. If Goetz* was a conative racist, then any
background desire to discover the truth and avoid error was not the only
desire influencing what he believed. His animus or indifference toward
blacks may also have caused him to believe what he did, and for present
purposes I will assume that they did. Thus, but for his possession of the
desire that q, or the belief that q, Goetz* would not have formed the
belief that p. He formed the belief that p because and only because he
was a racist, either cognitive or conative.
We can depict the foregoing snapshot of Goetz's folk or commonsense
psychology as follows.6
65. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 6I, at io-ii ("Inferiorizing and antipathy racism are dis-
tinct. Some inferiorizing racists do not hate the target of their belief.. . . Conversely, not
every race hater regards the target of her hatred as inferior.").
66. See, e.g., Robert Audi, Self-Deception, Rationalization and the Ethics of Belief:
An Essay in Moral Psychology, in Robert Audi, Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character
131, 132 (1997) (offering an analysis of self-deception according to which among other
things an actor is self-deceived if, having formed a true belief, desire pushes that belief
into unconsciousness, such that the actor sincerely avows that which is false); Alfred R.
Mele, Self-Deception Unmasked 50-51 (2oos) (offering an analysis of self-deception
according to which an actor is self-deceived if among other things his desires cause him
to form a false belief); B6Ia Szabados, Wishful Thinking and Self-Deception, 33 Analysis
201, 204 (1973) (claiming that the wishful thinker and the self-deceiver share in common
the fact that "[b]oth hold the belief they do hold largely because they want to believe"
as they do).
67. For a recent defense of the criminal law's dependence on such psychology against
some of the challenges from various forms of eliminativism, see Katrina L. Sifferd, In
Defense of the Use of Commonsense Psychology in the Criminal Law, 25 Law & Phil. 571
(20o6).
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With this account in hand, we can formulate three theories according to
which Goetz*'s belief that p was unreasonable. According to the first, it was
unreasonable for Goetz* to believe that p because his racist belief or desire
that q caused him to believe that p, and he should not have possessed that
racist belief or desire. According to the second, it was unreasonable for
Goetz* to believe thatp because he chose to believe thatp; he could have cho-
sen otherwise, and he should have chosen otherwise inasmuch as his choice
to believe that p was based on the racist belief or desire that q. According to
the third, it was unreasonable for Goetz* to believe thatp, not because he was
a racist and his racism caused him to believe that p (the first theory), nor
because he chose to believe that p and his choice was based on racism (the
second theory). Instead, his belief thatp was unreasonable because his racism
caused him to form the belief that p, and he chose to become or remain a
racist when he could and should have chosen otherwise.
The first theory (discussed in part II) links the unreasonableness of
Goetz*'s belief that p directly to his racist character. He forfeits his claim
to self-defense because he was a racist. The second and third theories (dis-
cussed in parts III and IV) link the unreasonableness of Goetz*'s belief
that p to a choice he made or failed to make, either to form the belief that
p, or to become or remain a racist. He forfeits his claim to self-defense
because he made a choice he should not have made.
II. THE CHARACTER THEORY
The first theory of unreasonableness claims that Goetz*'s belief that p was
unreasonable because his racism caused him to form that belief, and he
should not have been a racist. On this theory, Goetz* loses his claim of
self-defense because of the content of his character, because he possessed
racist beliefs or desires. He loses the defense because of who he is: a racist.
A liberal state can embrace the character theory of unreasonableness if two
conditions are satisfied. First, a liberal citizen ought not to possess the racist
beliefs or desires we are assuming that Goetz* possessed. Second, a liberal state
must be at liberty to rely upon the standing beliefs or desires an actor possesses
as a basis upon which to deny him a defense to which he would otherwise
have been entitled. In other words, it must be the case that a liberal state can
rely upon the content of an actor's character as the basis for a forfeiture rule.
I argue that the first condition is satisfied, but not the second. Consequently,
a liberal state cannot embrace the character theory of unreasonableness.
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A. Is Racism Wrong?
Racism can be rooted in an actor's beliefs, or in his desires, or both.
Racism rooted in an actor's desires (racism in the heart) is straightfor-
wardly inconsistent with citizenship in a liberal state. Racism rooted in an
actor's beliefs (racism in the head) bears a more complicated relationship
to the ideal of liberal citizenship.
1. Racism in the Heart
An actor whose racism resides in his heart is one who harbors animus, hostil-
ity, ill will, and so forth toward blacks, or who is at least indifferent to them.
Such animus or indifference can enter into an actor's psychology in two very
different ways. First, racial animus can directly influence what an actor does.
Its expression in action may be the point or purpose of the action, or at least
part of its point or purpose. Second, racial animus or indifference can influ-
ence what an actor believes, and thereby indirectly influence what he does.
When animus manifests itself directly in action, and when that action
already constitutes a criminal offense, what would otherwise be a run-of-
the-mill crime turns into a hate crime.68 Although the subject is one of con-
siderable controversy, a hate crime is probably best analyzed as an ordinary
crime committed with a specific goal or purpose in mind.6 9 A criminal act
68. An actor can of course choose to express his racial hatred or animus in acts that are
not already crimes, including speech acts. Expressions of racial hatred-whether through
speech acts or other forms of action-are fair targets of criminalization insofar as an actor has
control over whether or not to engage in them. Indeed, insofar as an actor has control over
the formation of an intent to humiliate or degrade another person, the formation of such an
intent might itself be a fair target of criminalization, all else being equal. Nonetheless, a range
of countervailing considerations, including those values associated with the First
Amendment, counsel against the criminalization of such speech acts or acts of intent forma-
tion. Compare R.A.V v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (holding that an ordinance
criminalizing "fighting words that contain ... messages of 'bias-motivated' hatred" violates
the First-Amendment rule against content-based discrimination), with Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 490 (1993) (holding that a penalty enhancement for a defendant who
selected his victim because of the victim's race does not violate the First Amendment).
69. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Reflections on Justifications for Defining Crimes by the
Category of Victim, 1992 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 617, 620-25; Jeffrie G. Murphy, Bias Crimes:
What Do Haters Deserve?, it Crim. Just. Ethics, Summer/Fall 1992, at 20, 21; Pai H.
Robinson, Hate Crime: Crime of Motive, Character, or Group Terror?, 1992/1993 Ann. Surv.
Am. L. 6o5, 6o6-o9. But see Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Punishing Hatred and
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turns into a hate crime when committed with the specific intent or pur-
pose to humiliate, degrade, or otherwise insult the victim because he is a
member of a protected class. The victim's humiliation is the end toward
which the actor acts, or at least one of his ends. It supplies the motive for
the action, and the actor wholeheartedly embraces that motive. On this view
of what makes a hate crime a crime of hate, Goetz*'s actions cannot be so
portrayed, inasmuch as his motivation was self-preservation, not humilia-
tion. He killed his putative assailant because he believed that his putative
assailant was about to kill him, not in order to humiliate or degrade.
Besides being expressed directly in action, racial animus or indifference
can also influence action indirectly, exercising its force in the first instance
on the beliefs an actor forms. An actor who harbors racial animus or indif-
ference is apt to form beliefs his non-racist counterpart would not form, and
conversely, he is apt not to form beliefs his non-racist counterpart would
form. We might say that such an actor is one whose desire that q "acts on"
him, whereas an actor who commits a hate crime is one who "acts on" his
desire that q. Thus, Goetz*'s desire that q may have caused him to form the
belief that p, which ultimately caused him to form the intent to kill. He did
not endorse and express that desire in action, but that desire nonetheless
caused him to form a belief he would not otherwise have formed.
Was it wrong for Goetz* to possess the desire that q, even if he did not
directly act on it? If we assume that most people possess the desire that q, at
least to one degree or another, then one might argue that it was not wrong.
In other words, one might say that the reasonable person is a conative racist,
because the reasonable person is the typical or ordinary person, and regret-
tably, the typical person is a conative racist.70 If so, then it was not wrong for
Goetz* to harbor animus toward blacks, or at least be indifferent to them.
Perhaps, but the better view is that citizens of a liberal state ought not
to possess the desire that q, whether or not most of them in fact do.7' The
simple fact of the matter is that a liberal citizen does not harbor race-based
Prejudice, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1o81, 1123 (2004) (arguing that "hate/bias crimes concern themselves
with new and novel sorts of mens rea" that cannot be understood as a form of specific intent).
70. See, e.g., Armour, supra note 36, at 787 ("The Reasonable Racist asserts that, even
if his belief that blacks are 'prone to violence' stems from pure prejudice, he should be
excused for considering the victim's race before using force because most similarly situated
Americans would have done so as well.").
71. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 28, at 235 ("[N]ormative reasonableness is a conception of rea-
sonableness that focuses on the beliefs and actions society ought to recognize as reasonable.
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animus toward his fellow citizens, nor does he harbor race-based indiffer-
ence. The conative constitution of liberal citizens has no room for such
sentiments. As a citizen of a liberal state, Goetz* should not have possessed
the desire that q. Moreover, had he not possessed that desire, he would not
have formed the belief that p, and had he not formed the belief that p, he
would not have pulled the trigger.
2. Racism in the Head
Goetz* should not have possessed the desire that q. But whether he should
or should not have possessed the belief that q--blacks are more prone to
violence than nonblacks-turns out to be more controversial. Racism in
the heart is out-of-bounds for liberal citizens, but what about racism in
the head? At the outset, we should reject once again the idea that Goetz*
should have believed that q, or was at least permitted to believe that q,
because most people believe that q, assuming that they do.72 What most
people believe is neither here nor there. A widespread belief might
nonetheless be one liberal citizens should not hold.
Instead, the argument to the effect that Goetz* ought to have believed
that q, or was at least permitted to believe that q, boils down to the claim
that q is true, and one ought to believe the truth, not to mention be per-
mitted to believe it. Moreover, one can hardly be called a racist for believ-
ing the truth. One can imagine two responses to this argument.
The first response is that the proposition that q is not true; on the con-
trary, it is false. It purports to be a valid statistical generalization when in
fact it is not.7 3 Instead, it is a false or misleading generalization, or in other
A positivist (or empirical) conception of reasonableness, in contrast, focuses on what most
individuals would actually feel, think, or do if they were in the defendant's situation.").
72. According to a poll taken around the time of the real Goetz case, "[w]hen black
New Yorkers were asked whether they would feel unsafe if they saw several loud, teenage
white boys on their subway car, 39 percent said yes. Would they feel similarly unsafe if the
youths were black? Yes, 51 percent said. The responses by whites was 55 percent and 71 per-
cent, respectively." Sam Roberts, Exploring Laws and the Legacy of the Goetz Case, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 23, 1989, at Bi.
73. Compare Armour, supra note 36, at 792 ("Even if we accept the.., claim that his
greater fear of blacks results wholly from his unbiased analysis of crime statistics, biases in
the criminal justice system undermine the reliability of the statistics themselves."), with
Randall Kennedy, Suspect Policy, New Republic, Sept. 13 & 20, I999, at 30, 32 ("Statistics
abundantly confirm that African Americans-and particularly young black men-commit
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words, a stereotype.74 Or, even if the generalization itself is statistically
valid, it tends to exercise undue influence on a person's thought processes,
getting more weight than it deserves, such that it ends up operating as a
de facto stereotype." In either case, if a proposition is false, or if it other-
wise corrupts an actor's belief-formation process so as to cause him to form
other beliefs that are false, then the actor should not believe the offending
proposition. Thus, Goetz* should not have believed that q.
The second response accepts or concedes that q is true, and it acknowl-
edges that an actor cannot be faulted, all else being equal, for believing that
which is true, but it nonetheless insists that all else is not equal. Even if the
proposition that q is true, even if it is a valid statistical generalization, and
not a stereotype, one might nonetheless argue that we should not always
believe the truth, nor therefore should the truth always be permitted to
influence other beliefs we form.76 We might all be better off believing that
q is false, even if q is true. Thus, Goetz* should not have believed that q.
Consider the debate over racial profiling. For example, suppose that it
turns out to be true that black motorists driving along a certain stretch of
highway are, all else being equal, more apt to be carrying contraband than
are nonblack motorists. Call this proposition q*. If q*is true, then a police
officer who relies on a driver's race when deciding whom to stop is more
likely to stop people who are in fact carrying contraband than he would if
he did not rely on it. The law might nonetheless have compelling reasons
to prohibit police officers from relying on race when deciding whom to
stop. Effective law enforcement is one goal worth pursuing, but not the
a dramatically disproportionate share of street crime in the United States. This is a socio-
logical fact, not a figment of the media's (or the police's) racist imagination.").
74. See, e.g., Lawrence Blum, Stereotypes and Stereotyping: A Moral Analysis, 33 Phil.
Papers 251, 26o (2004) ("[Sltereotypes are, or involve, not merely generalizations, but false
or misleading generalizations, i.e., overgeneralizations.").
75. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes 179 (2oo3)
("[Pleople are often inclined to overestimate the proportion of a particularly salient com-
ponent within a larger population."); id. at 187 ("Because ... attributes [like race] . . . are
'visually accessible, culturally meaningful, and interactionally relevant,' such factors tend
to occupy more of the decisionmaking space than their empirical role would support.");
Armour, supra note 36, at 791 ("[T]he typical person tends to perceive race as the overrid-
ing factor when the supposed assailant is black.").
76. Moreover, even if the proposition that q is true, some (perhaps many) actors in fact
believe that q, not because they are aware of the relevant statistical studies, but because they
believe that most people believe that q is true.
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only one. Profiles that include race threaten to increase racial stigmatiza-
tion and the social isolation of the group stigmatized.77 How one comes
down in the debate over profiling will depend on the size of these effects,
and on the moral weight one assigns to them, as well as the moral weight
one assigns to the costs and benefits of viable alternatives.
78
What are the comparable costs and benefits when we turn to self-
defense, assuming for the moment that an actor could choose or decide
whether or not to form the belief that p based on the belief that q?79 If q is
77. Compare Schauer, supra note 75, at 189 (" [U] nder circumstances of existing stigma-
tization by race or ethnicity for members of certain races or ethnic groups it again might
well be worth paying a social price just in order to avoid any further racial or ethnic stigma-
tization."), Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the
Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More
Generally, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1275, 1375-76 (2004) ("[R]acial profiling is an excellent exam-
ple of how criminal profiling accentuates embedded prejudices in the criminal law."), and
Kennedy, supra note 73, at 33 ("[D]efenders of racial profiling frequently neglect the costs
of the practice. They unduly minimize (or ignore altogether) the large extent to which
racial profiling constantly adds to the sense of resentment felt by blacks of every social stra-
tum toward the law enforcement establishment."), with Michael Levin, Responses to Race
Differences in Crime, 23 J. Soc. Phil. 5, 12 (1992) ("[I]f'racism' means unjustified race-con-
sciousness, race-based differentiations need not be racist. In particular, race-based screen-
ing is not 'racist' if justified by differential crime rates.").
78. Compare Schauer, supra note 75, at 197 ("[E]ven when race is a substantial factor,
and thus even when its exclusion would significantly decrease law-enforcement efficiency,
the consequences of excluding race from the profile is an increase in crime only if we are
holding cost and efficiency constant."), Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Essay,
Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1413, 1437-38 (2oo2) ("[W]e should be
deeply suspicious of racial profiling, however mild the government's actions and however
justified they may appear."), and Kennedy, supra note 73, at 34 ("Our commitment to a
just social order should prompt us to end racial profiling even if the generalizations on
which the technique is based are buttressed by empirical evidence."), with Mathias Risse
& Richard Zeckhauser, Racial Profiling, 32 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 131, 144 (2004) ("We submit...
that in a range of plausible cases, utilitarian considerations support racial profiling."), and
Peter H. Schuck, A Case for Profiling, American Lawyer, Jan. 2002, at 59, 61 ("A wise pol-
icy will insist that the justice of profiling depends on a number of variables."). For a reply
to Risse and Zuckhauser, see Annabelle Lever, Why Racial Profiling Is Hard to Justify: A
Response to Risse and Zeckhauser, 33 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 94 (2005). For thoughts on whether
or not the law permits racial profiling in the context of highway drug interdiction, see, e.g.,
Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug
Interdiction on the Highway, iO Mich. L. Rev. 651, 744 (2002) (summarizing conclusions
based on analysis under the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause).
79. This assumption is rejected in part II.
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true, then an actor who relies on a putative assailant's race when deciding
to shoot or wait is more likely to stop someone who is in fact a deadly
aggressor than he would be if he did not rely on it. The law might
nonetheless once again have compelling reasons to prohibit an actor's
reliance on race. Just as official recognition of q* may threaten to increase
racial stigmatization and the social isolation of the stigmatized group, so
too may official recognition of q. How one comes down on the question
will once again likely depend on the size of these effects and on the moral
weight one assigns to them."
One could of course make the calculus even more complex. For exam-
ple, one might argue that official stigma is not the only cost involved if the
law countenances an actor's belief that q. Corrupting the jury's search for
the truth might be another."1 If an actor claiming self-defense is permitted
to introduce evidence at trial designed to substantiate the truth of the
proposition that q in order to establish the reasonableness of his belief that
p, the process of exposing the jury to such evidence might end up distort-
ing its deliberations. In other words, evidence intended to establish the sta-
tistical validity of a race-based generalization might end up causing racial
stereotypes to taint the jury's verdict. Consequently, white defendants who
8o. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 165 (1997) ("Racially dis-
criminatory self-protective action by private persons reinforces existing mistrusts and
resentments and circulates them throughout the various spheres of society, public as well
as private."); Armour, supra note 36, at 795 ("[H]astier use of force against blacks forces
blacks who do not want to be mistaken for assailants to avoid ostensibly public places...
and core community activities .... ); Kelman, supra note 36, at 816 ("[Y]oung black men
are stigmatized, excluded from participation in generally available activities . . . subjected
to the demeaning supposition that others know a lot about them when who they truly are
as individuals is wholly misassessed.").
81. See Armour, supra note 36, at 795 ("[R]ace-based evidence of reasonableness impairs
the capacity of jurors to rationally and fairly strike the balance between the costs of wait-
ing (increased risk for the person who perceives imminent attack) and the costs of not wait-
ing (injury or death to the immediate victim, exclusion of blacks from core community
activities, and, ultimately, reduction of individuals to predictable objects)."). For ideas
about how the law might counteract the effects of prejudice on jury decision making, see,
e.g., Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the
Prejudice Habit, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 733, 768 (1995) (Group "references that challenge . . .
factfinders to reexamine and resist their discriminatory responses enhance the rationality
of the fact-finding process."); Lee, supra note 28, at 252-53 (proposing that judges give
"race-switching" instructions in appropriate cases).
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claim to have killed blacks in self-defense will more often be acquitted on
grounds of self-defense than they should be. This potential result is another
cost that one must take into account.
For present purposes, I will simply assume that the calculus comes out
against Goetz,* and that he should not have possessed the belief that q.
Thus, Goetz* should not have formed the belief that p because he should
not have been a racist, i.e., he should not have possessed the belief or desire
that q. Still, the belief upon which Goetz* "acted" was the belief that p, not
the belief that q, and the desire on which he "acted" was the desire to save
his life, not the desire that q. He did not "act upon" his racist belief or
desire." Those mental states entered the picture not at the point of action,
but earlier, at the point of belief formation. 83Thus, if the law refuses to cred-
it Goetz*'s claim of self-defense, it does so in the end because, according to
the character theory, he was a racist. His racism caused him to form the
belief that p, which caused him to form the belief that he ought to kill his
attacker, which caused him to form the intent to kill his attacker, and so
forth. Consequently, although Goetz* is convicted of murder, what he did
wrong was to be who he was. What he did wrong was to be a racist.
82. When we say that an actor acted with "discriminatory intent," one thing we might
mean is that the belief on which the actor "acts," though itself unobjectionable, is nonethe-
less based in part on an objectionable stereotype. The stereotype is a but-for cause of the
unobjectionable belief. See David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of
Brown, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935, 956-59 (1989) (proposing this definition of "discriminatory
intent"); see also Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of
Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 Geo. L.J. 279, 289 (1997) ("What the [Supreme] Court means
by [discriminatory] intent is that an individual or group was treated differently because of
race. . . . [T]he key question is whether race made a difference in the decisionmaking
process, a question that targets causation, rather than subjective mental states."); Amy L.
Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 Ind. L.J. 1129, 1138-39 (1999) (distinguishing between
two different meanings of "intentional" as that term might be used in antidiscrimination
law, including a "causal view"). The actor may or may not be aware that he possesses the
stereotype or that his unobjectionable belief is based on that stereotype. See Strauss, supra,
at 960 (noting that the causal account of discriminatory intent "reaches both conscious
and unconscious discrimination"). On this view Goetz* clearly acted with "discriminatory
intent." Having said that, it is one thing to impose civil liability for acting with such intent.
It is another to deny an otherwise-available defense to criminal liability.
83. If one nonetheless insists that Goetz* did "act on" the belief that q at the moment he
pulled the trigger, then it would seem to follow that he acted on all the other background
beliefs causing him to form the belief that p. But it seems quite implausible to say that
whenever we act on a belief we also act on all the background beliefs causing its formation.
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Now, Goetz* is not punished just because he is a racist. Indeed, one
might insist that he is not punished for being a racist at all. On the con-
trary, he is punished because he intentionally killed someone. True, but he
intentionally killed someone only because he believed that he was about
to be killed, and he believed that he was about to be killed only because
he was a racist who had the misfortune to find himself in a situation in
which his racism, combined with other facts about the situation, caused
him to form the belief thatp. So although he is not punished just for being
a racist, he is punished because he was a racist unlucky enough to find
himself in a situation in which his racism caused him to believe thatp, and
having no reason to ignore that belief, he formed the intention to kill and
then executed that intention in action.
B. Punishment for Being a Racist
No state can coherently punish a person for something unless the person
punished is responsible for it. Was Goetz* responsible for the racist beliefs
or desires he possessed, which beliefs and desires caused him to form the
belief that p, and ultimately to pull the trigger? According to the charac-
ter theory, he was.
The character theory says that we are responsible for the standing
beliefs and desires constitutive of our characters, such as Goetz*'s standing
belief and desire that q, because and just because we are our characters. 84
In other words, we are responsible for who we are just because we are who
we are. Indeed, our common practices of praise and blame presuppose
some such responsibility. We praise people for their virtues and blame
them for their vices. Our praise and blame are often directed at the per-
son for being this or that, and not just at what he has done or failed to do
because he is this or that. Consequently, we are free to, and indeed should,
blame Goetz* for possessing the racist beliefs and desires making him a
racist, and we are free to do so without regard to how or why he came to
possess them. Simple possession is enough.
Yet the question is not whether we can condemn Goetz* for being a
racist. The question is whether the state can, and more precisely, whether
84. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 18, at 571 ("[W]e are responsible for our character
because we are, in part, constituted by our characters.").
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the state can condemn him for being a racist through the hardship that
makes punishment what it is. A liberal state need not treat the racists in its
midst the same as it does those who accord their fellow citizens the concern
and respect to which they are due. The state is free to criticize them for
their racist characters. It might also refuse to do business with them. The
KKK Construction Co. should not be disappointed if the state decides to
contract with another firm. Nonetheless, any recognizably liberal state has
no authority to punish its citizens for who they are, no matter what the
content of their character.8" Nor should the content of an actor's character
form the basis upon which the state denies him a defense to which he
would otherwise have been entitled. If a liberal state cannot make it a crime
to be a racist, then neither should it permit only non-racists to gain access
to otherwise available defenses, and deny access to racists.
The analogy here would be to so-called status offenses. Our law does
not in fact punish actors just for being who they are,8 6 nor should it. It
might punish them for doing things that result in them being who they
are, or even for not doing things to try to change who they are. But it does
not, nor should it, punish them just for who they are. Again, the reason is
not that we are not responsible for who we are. We are responsible for who
we are, even if we have not chosen to be who we are, just because we are
85. See, e.g., George Sher, In Praise of Blame 69 (zoo6) (arguing that it is permissible
to blame a person for his character, even if he is not responsible for it, but not to punish
him for it); Robert Merrihew Adams, Involuntary Sins, 94 Phil. Rev. 3, 21 (1985) (arguing
that it is permissible to hold responsible and to blame a person for his character, but not
to punish him for it); Angela M. Smith, Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity
in Mental Life, 115 Ethics 236, 270-71 (2oo5) (arguing that we are responsible for our
beliefs but also noting that "[o]ne question ... is whether we are open to the very same
kinds of appraisals for our [beliefs] as we are for our voluntary actions") (emphasis added).
But cf. Tadros, supra note 4o, at 263 (stating that a "defendant who forms a false belief
about the risks in a particular case" based on "prejudiced background beliefs" is an "excep-
tion" to the "general principle" that defendants who unwittingly impose risks do "not
show the appropriate kind and degree of fault required for the proper imposition of crim-
inal responsibility"); Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning the Racist Personality: Why the
Critics of Hate Crime Legislation Are Wrong, 4o B.C. L. Rev. 739, 742 (1999) (arguing that
a "vision of virtuous citizen character in a republic ... requires us to condemn [and pun-
ish] the racist personality").
86. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 66o, 666-67 (1962) (holding that a "state
law which imprisons a person" for the "'status' of narcotics addiction" violates the Eight
Amendment because it "inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment").
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who we are. The reason is that the responsibility we bear for our charac-
ters in virtue of the fact that we are our characters, though strong enough
to underwrite some forms of blame and censure, is not strong enough to
underwrite state punishment.
Proposed amendments to the character theory do nothing to remedy
this problem. For example, one might argue that an actor is responsible
for his character and thus liable to punishment for his character, unless he
lacked the capacity or a fair opportunity to choose or otherwise shape his
character, such that his character is not his own, in which case he is nei-
ther responsible nor liable to punishment. Or one might argue that such
an actor, though he remains responsible for who he is and thus liable to
punishment, should nonetheless receive the state's mercy, or at least be a
candidate for its mercy. 7 For example, suppose that Goetz* possessed his
racist belief or desire only because he was the victim of prior attacks
involving black assailants."s Indeed, suppose he despises himself for what
he has become, and has tried without success to rid himself of his racism.
Or suppose Goetz* had been brainwashed into being a racist. Under the
proposed amendments to the character theory, Goetz might not forfeit his
claim to self-defense, or he might forfeit his claim but nonetheless catch a
break in the name of mercy.
These amendments improve the character theory, but they hardly fix it.
Why not? Because if and when an actor is punished, either because he has
no excuse for his character or because he is denied mercy, it remains the
case that he is being punished, not for anything he has done or failed to
do, but for who he is.89 The target of the state's punishment continues to
87. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion
in Criminal Law, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 366-72 (1996) (making this suggestion).
88. See, e.g., Armour, supra note 36, at 799 (describing such a person as an "[i]nvolun-
tary [n]egrophobe"). Armour argues that such an actor should not be permitted to claim
self-defense because "[Ilegal recognition of the Involuntary Negophobe's claims would
subvert the general welfare by destroying the legitimacy of the courts." Id. at 8o2.
89. See, e.g., Moore, supra note i8, at 585 ("That punishment would be deserved because
of bad character alone is something the character theorist seems committed to, however much
other values prevent punishment of this dass of deserving persons."). One might of course take
the view that no one is ever responsible for his character, in which case one would end up being
a skeptic about the possibility of moral responsibility altogether. See, e.g., Robert Kane, A
Contemporary Introduction to Free Will 121 (2005) (describing the thesis that free will requires
ultimate responsibility which in turn requires that "we must be responsible for forming the
wills or characters that now determine our acts").
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be his character, but a liberal state worthy of the name cannot take char-
acter to be the ultimate target of state punishment. Thus, while Goetz* is
no doubt responsible for his character, he cannot be punished for it, nor
therefore can he be punished for it through the backdoor workings of a
forfeiture rule.
III. THE CHOICE THEORIES
The character theory of unreasonableness says that Goetz*'s belief that he
was about to be killed was unreasonable, such that he forfeits his claim to
self-defense, because he was a racist. The forfeiture is based on the content
of his character. In contrast, the remaining two theories base the forfeiture
on some choice he made but should not have made, or on some choice he
failed to make but should have made. These theories therefore ground
Goetz*'s responsibility for believing that p in some choice he made. While
a liberal state cannot legitimately punish a person for who he is, it can
legitimately punish him for the choices he makes (or at least for some of
those choices). Likewise, while a liberal state cannot legitimately deny an
actor a defense based on who he is, it can deny him a defense based on the
choices he makes (or at least some of those choices).
We can distinguish -two choice-based theories of unreasonableness.
According to the belief-choice theory, Goetz*'s belief that p was unreason-
able because he chose to believe that p when he should have chosen not to
believe that p. The object of the forbidden choice is the belief that p.
According to the character-choice theory, Goetz*'s belief that p was unrea-
sonable because he should not have chosen to possess the racist beliefs or
desires causing him to form the belief that p, but he did so choose; or he
should have chosen to dispossess himself of them, but he failed to do so.
In short, he chose to become or remain a racist when he should not have
so chosen. The objects of the forbidden choice are those acts or omissions
that caused him to possess the belief or desire that q.90
90. According to another choice-based theory (not discussed in the text), Goetz*
should lose his claim of self-defense, not because he chose to believe that p, nor because he
chose to be a racist, but because he failed to stop his racist beliefs from causing him to form
the belief that p: He failed to exercise doxastic-self control when he could and should have
exercised such self-control. In other words, he should have stopped his stereotypical beliefs
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A. The Belief-Choice Theory
Recall Goetz*'s psychology at the moment he pulled the trigger." Starting
with his network of background beliefs and desires, including the belief or
desire that q, Goetz* may have thought about whether his life was in imme-
diate danger, or he may not have. Either way, he formed the belief that it
from being activated in the first place, or if he failed at that, he should have stopped his
activated stereotypical beliefs from causing him to form the belief that p. If such self-con-
trol is possible, its exercise is unlikely to be subject to one's conscious will. See, e.g., John
A. Bargh, The Cognitive Monster: The Case Against the Controllability of Automatic
Stereotype Effects, in Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology 361, 378 (Shelly Chaiken
& Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) (" [T] he evidence to date concerning people's realistic chances
of [consciously] controlling the influence of their automatically activated stereotypes
weighs in heavily on the negative side."); Timothy D. Wilson et al., Mental Contamination
and the Debiasing Problem, in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive
Judgment 185, 200 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2oo2) (expressing "pessimis[m] about
people's natural ability to willfully control and correct their [contaminated] judgments"
though "by no means suggesting that reducing mental contamination is a lost cause"). But
see Nilanjana Dasgupta & Luis M. Rivera, From Automatic Antigay Prejudice to Behavior:
The Moderating Role of Conscious Beliefs about Gender and Behavioral Control, 91 J.
Personality & Soc. Psych. 268, 277 (2oo6) ("[T]he present data illustrate that relatively
spontaneous interpersonal actions can be modified by motivation and control[. F]uture
research might investigate whether .. . [these results] generalize to other .. .actions and
decisions that are more constrained by cognitive load or time pressure."); Patricia G.
Devine & Margo J. Monteith, Automaticity and Control in Stereotyping, in Dual-Process
Theories in Social Psychology, supra, at 339, 355 (discussing "findings [that] provide reason
for optimism that control over stereotyping is possible").
Instead, the self-control needed to counteract the automatic influence of stereotypes on
belief formation is probably best portrayed as a sophisticated mental habit operating in
much the same unconscious and automatic manner as the stereotypes it fights. The idea is
to enlist a good habit to neutralize a bad one. See, e.g., Patricia G. Devine et al., Breaking
the Prejudice Habit: Progress and Obstacles, in Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination
185, 202 (Stuart Oskamp ed., 2000) ("For low-prejudice people who already possess the
requisite internal motivation to overcome prejudice, the challenge is to learn the skills nec-
essary to respond consistently with their nonprejudiced beliefs."); John F Dovidio et al.,
Reducing Contemporary Prejudice: Combating Explicit and Implicit Bias at the
Individual and Intergroup Level, in Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination, supra, at 137,
145 ("[S]elf-regulation, extended over time, may produce changes even in previously auto-
matic, implicit negative responses."); Jack Glaser & John F Kihlstrom, Compensatory
Automaticity: Unconscious Volition Is Not an Oxymoron, in The New Unconscious 171,
171 (Ran R. Hassin et al. eds., 2oo5) ("[U]nconscious vigilance for bias can lead to correc-
tive processes that also operate without awareness or intent."); Margo J. Monteith et al.,
Putting the Brakes on Prejudice: On the Development and Operation of Cues for Control,
83 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1029, 1045 (2002) ("[P]eople can learn to put the brakes
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was, and that killing was necessary to prevent being killed. Likewise, he
may have thought about what he ought to do, or he may not have. Again,
either way, he formed the twin beliefs that he ought to save himself and
that he ought to kill his assailant in order to accomplish that end. He then
chose to kill, causing himself to form the intent to kill, and finally, he chose
to execute that intent in action, causing his finger to pull the trigger.
Goetz* is in control at four points in this sequence. First, he is in control
if and when he thinks about whether or not his life is in danger. Thinking,
deliberating, reflecting and so forth are mental acts over which we have some
measure of control. 92 Second, he is in control if and when he thinks about
what he ought to do. Again, thinking, deliberating, reflecting and so forth
are mental acts over which we have some measure of control. Third, he is in
on their prejudices and control the influence of processes that otherwise could result in
racially biased behavior"); Kerry Kawakami et al., Just Say No (to Stereotyping): Effects of
Training in the Negation of Stereotypic Associations on Stereotype Activation, 78 J.
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 871, 884 (2000) ("[P]articipants who received extensive train-
ing in negating stereotypes were able to reduce . . . stereotype activation."); Gordon B.
Moskowitz et al., Preconsciously Controlling Stereotyping: Implicitly Activated Egalitarian
Goals Prevent the Activation of Stereotyps, 18 Soc. Cognition I5I, 173 (2ooo) ("[C]hronic
[egalitarian] goals disrupt stereotype activation.").
This alternative theory is perhaps best understood as a variation on the character-choice
theory. See infra pp. 162-70. The character-choice theory says that Goetz* loses his defense
if and because he chose to become or remain a racist. The alternative theory says that he
loses his defense if and because he chose not to develop, or at least chose not to try to devel-
op, the right cognitive habits. See, e.g., Simon Wigley, Automaticity, Consciousness and
Moral Responsibility, 2o Phil. Psych. 209, 218 (2007) ("[A]n automatic agent is praisewor-
thy or blameworthy not because of the immediate actions that led to a good or bad out-
come, but rather because of what they did, or omitted to do, in the past."). Accordingly,
it might be called the habit-choice theory. Could a liberal state make it a crime for a citi-
zen to fail to try to develop such a habit? For example, could a liberal state make it a crime
for a citizen to fail to attend a diversity training program the goal of which is to instill the
requisite habit of doxastic self-control? If not, then neither should it be permitted to base
the forfeiture of an otherwise valid claim of self-defense upon such an omission. In any
event, it bears noting that the prejudice habit is apparently easier to acquire than it is to
break. See Aiden R Gregg et al., Easier Done Than Undone: Asymmetry in the
Malleability of Implicit Preferences, 90 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. I, 17 (20o6)
("[P]eople can speedily develop, at an implicit level, unfavorable and undeserved evalua-
tions of social groups that they can only laboriously unburden themselves of them later.").
91. See supra text accompanying note 27.
92. See, e.g., Nomy Arpaly, Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free
Will 96 (2oo6) ("[R]eflection, like fishing or fact finding, is a process we can decide to ini-
tiate but whose results we cannot choose."). It might be more accurate to say that we can
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control when he chooses to form the intent to kill. Choosing, like thinking,
is a mental act over which we have control.93 Fourth, he is in control when
he chooses to execute that intention, transforming it into action. Again,
choosing is a mental act over which we have control. At each of these
moments, Goetz* has done something that he might not have done, even if
that which he has done is a mental act, and not a bodily one.
More important is when he is not in control. He is not in control at the
moment he forms the belief that his life is in danger, and that killing was
the only way to save himself He has no control over whether he forms
that belief at that moment or not. He cannot will, decide, or choose to
believe that p or not-p9 None of us has such direct control over our
beliefs. We have direct control over our choices and actions, but not over
our beliefs. The only control we have over our beliefs is indirect. We can
act or fail to act in ways that affect the evidence available to us, which can
in turn affect the beliefs we form. We can also act or fail to act in ways that
affect our cognitive capacities and habits, which can in turn affect the
beliefs we form. We can also reflect on the beliefs we have formed, after
we have formed them, and we can choose whether or not to endorse or
disavow those beliefs.9" Yet whether we possess them or not in the first
place is not up to us. Our beliefs just happen to us when they happen.
choose to think, but we cannot choose not to think, though we can choose to do things to
try to distract ourselves from thinking.
93. See, e.g., Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will 24 (1996) ("Choices and deci-
sions are acts of mind (or will), and hence events that happen at a time, possibly terminat-
ing deliberations and giving rise to intentions."); Alfred R. Mele, Motivation and Agency
210 (2003) ("[P] ractical deciding [i]s a momentary mental action of intention formation.").
94. See, e.g., David Owens, Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic
Normativity 85 (2000) ("[B]elief is not subject to the will."); William P. Alston, The
Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification, 2 Phil. Perspectives 257, 263 (1988)
("[W]e are not so constituted as to be able to take up propositional attitudes at will.");
Neil Levy, Doxastic Responsibility, 155 Synthese 127, 148 (2007) (concluding among
other things that "arguments purporting to establish that we have direct control over our
beliefs are not persuasive"); Dion Scott-Kakures, On Belief and Captivity of the Will, 54
Phil. & Phenomenological Res. 77, 77 (1994) (arguing that it is conceptually, and not
merely contingently, true that "with respect to our beliefs our wills are captive"); Bernard
Williams, Deciding to Believe, in Bernard Williams, Problems of the Self 136, 148 (1973)
("[Ijt is not [merely] a contingent fact that I cannot bring it about, just like that, that I
believe something.").
95. See, e.g., L. Jonathan Cohen, An Essay on Belief and Acceptance z2 (1992)
("Acceptance, in contrast with belief, occurs at will .... ); Stephen Shute, Knowledge and
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If so, then the belief-choice theory is a nonstarter. It begins from a false
premise. It presupposes that Goetz* should not have chosen to form the
belief that p because that belief was based in part on racist beliefs or
desires, and that Goetz* should therefore forfeit his claim to self-defense
because, contrary to what he should have done, he chose to believe that
p. But Goetz* did not choose to believe that p. He did not choose to
believe that p because he could not have so chosen. He may still be
responsible for forming the belief that p,96 just as he is responsible for his
Belief in Criminal Law, in Criminal Law Theory, supra note 63, at 171, 192 ("Acceptances
...engage the will in a different way [than do beliefs]. Beliefs are 'passive.' They cannot
be acquired directly through an act of will.... In contrast, acceptances are 'active'; they do
respond to will."). But cf. Raimo Tuomela, Belief Versus Acceptance, 2 Phil. Explorations
122, 136 (2000) (concluding that "acceptance need not be intentional action, [and thus] the
differences between belief and acceptance do not boil down to the simple view that accept-
ance, contrary to belief, is based on the agent's direct exercise of his will").
96. Some writers argue that we have the same sort of control over our beliefs as we do
over our actions, and as such, that we bear the same responsibility for our beliefs as we do
for our actions. See, e.g., Carl Ginet, Deciding to Believe, in Knowledge, Truth, and
Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue 63, 63 (Matthias Steup
ed., 2001) (defending the "naive intuition that coming to believe something just by decid-
ing to do so is possible"); Keith Frankish, Deciding to Believe Again, 116 Mind 523, 523
(2007) (defending the "view that we can form beliefs directly"); Christoph Jager,
Epistemic Deontology, Doxastic Voluntarism, and the Principle of Alternative
Possibilities, in Knowledge and Belief 217, 226 (Winfried L6ffler & Paul Weingartner
eds., 2004) (concluding that "there is a crucial sense in which we hold [beliefs] freely" and
that this suffices for holding us responsible for our beliefs); Sharon Ryan, Doxastic
Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief, 114 Phil. Stud. 47, 70 (2003) ("If you have com-
patibilist intuitions, you should deny [the] premise [that doxastic attitudes are never
under our voluntary control]."); Matthias Steup, Doxastic Freedom, 16i Synthese 375, 375
(2008) ("Compatibilism entails that our actions and our doxastic attitudes [including our
beliefs] are mostly free."). But see Nikolaj Nottelmann, The Analogy Argument for
Doxastic Voluntarism, 131 Phil. Stud. 559, 559 (2006) (rejecting arguments that "belief
formations may qualify as voluntary in perfect analogy to certain types of actions or even
to actions in general").
Other writers argue that we do not have the same control over our beliefs as we do over
our actions, but that we bear some responsibility for our beliefs nonetheless. See, e.g.,
Adams, supra note 85, at 17 ("[B]lameworthiness of states of mind[, including beliefs,] is not
dependent upon voluntariness."); Robert Audi, Doxastic Voluntarism and the Ethics of
Belief, in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty, supra, at 93, 1O5 (The conclusion that "neither
believing nor forming beliefs is a case of action" does not "prevent our sustaining a deontic
version of an ethics of belief ...."); Richard Feldman, Voluntary Belief and Epistemic
Evaluation, in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty, supra, at 77, 90 (concluding that "deontological
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character,97 but whatever responsibility he bears for that belief is too weak
to support punishing him for it. A liberal state cannot punish an actor for
a choice he never made, nor can a choice he never made be the basis for
denying him a defense to which he would otherwise have been entitled.
B. The Character-Choice Theory
The second choice-based theory of unreasonableness, unlike the first, does
manage to get off the ground. It says that Goetz*'s belief that p was unrea-
sonable, not because he should not have chosen to believe that p (but did
so choose), but rather because he should not have chosen to possess the
racist beliefs or desires causing him to form the belief that p (but did so
choose). Because he chose to possess those beliefs or desires, and because
he should not have so chosen, he loses his claim of self-defense if and
when those beliefs or desires cause him to form the belief thatp. In other
words, Goetz* loses his claim of self-defense, not just because he is a racist,
but because he chose to become or remain a racist.
The analogy here is to crimes of possession. The law does not punish
an actor just because he possesses an item the law does not permit him to
possess. Instead, it punishes him if and because he has done something to
come into possession of it, realizing what it is that he has come to pos-
sess; or if and because, upon realizing that he is already in possession of
the prohibited item, he fails to do something to dispossess himself of it. s
judgments about belief ... do not imply that belief is voluntary"); Pamela Hieronymi,
Responsibility for Believing, 161 Synthese 357, 358 (2008) ("[O]n at least one plausible
account of what it is for a thing to be voluntary and what it is to be responsible for some-
thing, beliefs are not voluntary and yet, for failing to be voluntary, they are a central exam-
ples of the sort of thing for which we are most fundamentally responsible."); Nishi Shah,
Clearing Space for Doxastic Voluntarism, 85 Monist 436, 436 (2002) ("While I agree ...
that agents don't have the capacity to decide what to believe, I disagree that the application
of deontological concepts requires this kind of control."); Smith, supra note 85, at 271
("[W]hat makes us responsible for our attitudes[, including our beliefs], is not that we have
voluntarily chosen them ... but that they are the kinds of states that reflect and are in prin-
ciple sensitive to our rational judgments.").
97. See supra part II.B.
98. See Model Penal Code § 2.oi(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("Possession is an
act.., if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of
his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession.").
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The target of the state's punishment is not possession of the proscribed
item itself. The target is the actor's choice to cause himself to come into
possession of it, or the choice to retain possession of it when he could and
should have gotten rid of it.
C. Punishment for Choosing to Be Racist
Basing a forfeiture rule upon a choice an actor should not have made
avoids the problem associated with the character-based theory of unrea-
sonableness, inasmuch as the forfeiture is triggered not by the actor's
character, but rather by a choice he makes. Likewise, it avoids the prob-
lem associated with the belief-choice theory, inasmuch as that which
triggers the forfeiture is a choice over which the actor has control, not a
choice over which he has no control, which is to say no choice at all.
Nonetheless, the character-choice theory has at least three problems of
its own, which can be grouped under the headings of luck, legality, and
liberalism. 9
1. Luck
The first problem with the character-choice theory is luck. Suppose that
Goetz* was offered a substantial sum of money to try to become a racist.
Wishing to collect, he decided to join the Ku Klux Klan, hoping or believ-
ing that he would thereby become a racist. Assume that as a result of that
choice he does indeed succeed in transforming himself into a racist. Now
assume (after collecting his cash) that he is unlucky enough to find him-
self in a situation in which, because he is a racist, he forms the mistaken
belief that a black person is about to kill him. If as a result of that mis-
taken belief he kills his imagined assailant, he will be guilty of murder-
or at least he will be if his belief that p is unreasonable, which we are
assuming it is, inasmuch as he would not have formed that belief but for
his earlier choice to join the KKK.
Now consider Goetz**. He too joins the KKK, hoping or believing
that he will thereby turn himself into a racist. Unlike Goetz*, Goetz**'s
99. In addition to the problems grouped under these headings is the problem of dis-
proportionality associated with forfeiture rules in general.
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efforts fail. Despite his regular attendance at rallies, cross burnings and
the like, he never ends up believing racist stereotypes or harboring racial
animus. He is not even indifferent. Or suppose that he does succeed in
turning himself into a racist, but that he, unlike Goetz*, is lucky enough
never to find himself in a situation in which his racism causes him to
believe that he is about to be killed. Goetz* and Goetz** made the same
choice. Each chose to join the KKK hoping or believing that he would
thereby become a racist. Likewise, neither chose to place himself in a sit-
uation in which he realized that his racism would or might cause him to
believe that p.'°° The only thing setting them apart is luck. Bad luck for
Goetz*. Good luck for Goetz**. Goetz* is guilty of murder. Goetz** is
guilty of nothing.
Perhaps that outcome should not be disturbing. Rightly or wrongly,
criminal liability often depends on all kinds of luck. °1o For example, mur-
derers are punished more severely than attempted murderers, even if luck
is the only thing that sets them apart. If you sneeze just as the trigger is
pulled, thereby missing the target, then the crime is attempted murder. If
you do not sneeze, and the target is killed, then the crime is murder.
Perhaps the desire to purge all luck from the criminal law is a desire des-
tined never to be fulfilled. Perhaps we shouldn't worry about luck's influ-
ence on the fates of Goetz* and Goetz**. Perhaps. Yet even if their differ-
ent fates are not a problem, or not much of one, the character-choice the-
ory has two more.
ioo. One could say that many crimes happen just because the people who commit
them find themselves in unlucky situations amenable to their commission. For example,
an actor who finds himself alone with an unattended cash register and who as a result
decides then and there to commit larceny was, one could say, unlucky enough to find
himself alone with the cash register. But we hardly feel any sympathy for the unlucky lar-
cenist. If so, then why should we feel any sympathy for the unlucky Goetz* who likewise
finds himself in an unlucky situation? One salient difference between the unlucky larce-
nist and the unlucky Goetz* is that the former, but not the latter, chooses to do that
which he presumably believes he is not permitted to do. The unlucky larcenist is pre-
sumably aware of the fact that he is committing a crime. In contrast, the unlucky Goetz*
presumably believes under the circumstances as he believes them to be that he is permit-
ted to kill.
tot. See, e.g., Moore, supra note i8, at 235 (distinguishing between result luck, luck in
execution, planning luck, and constitutive luck).
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2. Legality
The second problem with the character-choice theory is legality.
Forfeiture rules covertly criminalize the conduct upon which the forfei-
ture is based. For example, if an actor chooses to place himself in a situ-
ation in which he will or might be subject to a threat, and the threat
materializes, he loses any defense to which he might otherwise have been
entitled if he commits a crime in order to avoid the threat. Of course, an
actor who makes such a choice will not be punished unless and until the
threat materializes; nor will he be punished unless and until he commits
a crime in response to it. In the law's eyes, moreover, he is guilty of the
crime committed in response to the threat, not for choice to expose him-
self to the threat in the first place. But the law blinds itself to reality here,
since the only thing the actor has chosen to do that he should not have
done is to risk exposing himself to a threat he ought instead to have cho-
sen to avoid.
So far as I know, no state makes it a crime to choose to expose oneself
to a threat. But a state could criminalize that choice if wanted to. A state
could, if it wanted, make it a free-standing crime to choose to place one-
self in a threatening situation, whether or not the anticipated threat comes
to pass, and whether or not the actor commits a crime in an effort to avoid
it if it does come to pass." 2 The same goes for the intoxication forfeiture
rule. A state could, if it wanted, make it a crime to consume intoxicating
substances, no matter what happens thereafter. The wisdom of such a
crime might be open to question, but the fairness of enforcing it would
not be, assuming one was aware of the new prohibition. Compliance
would not be difficult. Don't drink. Avoid situations that you realize
might be threatening. That's all it would take.
But now imagine that a legislature adds the following provision to its
penal code: Whoever believes unreasonably shall be guilty of a felony.
Now we have a problem. Wouldn't such a provision be unduly vague, leav-
ing those subject to it without fair notice as to how to comply? Are you
believing unreasonably now?
Indeed, matters are even worse. A statute making it a crime to believe
unreasonably would, because it is so vague, constitute a delegation of
102. See, e.g., Sangero, supra note 36, at 337-39 (discussing a possibility along these
lines).
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law-making power to prosecutors, jurors, and judges.0 3 Prosecutors
would decide when a person has believed unreasonably when they decide
to bring a prosecution. Juries would decide when a person has believed
unreasonably when they decide to return a conviction, and judges would
decide when a person has believed unreasonably when they decide to
uphold a conviction on appeal. Under the reasonable-belief rule of self-
defense, an actor commits a crime-enforced via a forfeiture rule-when
prosecutors, juries, and judges say that he has committed a crime, and
not before. Prosecutors, juries and judges can of course exercise this
power only when an actor kills someone. But this limitation on the del-
egation of the power to define crimes does nothing to legitimize its exer-
cise within the scope of that delegation.
Perhaps the legislature could enact a more specific provision meant to
address particular instances of unreasonable believing. Go back to the
Goetz* case and the problem of the racism. Perhaps the legislature could
make it a crime to choose to become a racist, as the character-choice the-
ory maintains. You commit this crime if you set out on a course of action,
either with the goal of becoming a racist or foreseeing that you will or
might become one, whether or not you actually do. Or maybe the crime
can be made even more specific. Suppose you commit a crime if you join
the KKK or associate with skinheads with the purpose of becoming a
racist, or foreseeing that you will or might become one. Such a crime
would not be unduly vague. Citizens would be able to comply. Just stay
away from the KKK, and don't consort with skinheads.
Of course, most of us don't need to join the KKK or hobnob with skin-
heads in order to acquire beliefs that can fairly be characterized as racist
(though such associations might be needed to acquire racist desires). On
the contrary, the prevailing wisdom among cognitive scientists is that
more or less all of us are burdened with racist beliefs. Some of us are aware
of our affliction. We have taken the on-line Implicit Association Test and
realize that we automatically associate black with bad. 4 The rest of us are
103. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 11o Harv.
L. Rev. 469, 475 (1996) ("[R]esort[] to general statutory language ... necessarily transfers
lawmaking responsibility to courts (or prosecutors).").
104. See Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit (last visited Jan. 4,
zoo8). For the initial research "apprais[ing] the IAT method's usefulness for measuring
evaluative associations that underlie implicit attitudes," see Anthony G. Greenwald et al.,
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strangers to ourselves, blissfully unaware, willfully ignorant, or self-
deceived. In addition, most of us manage to become racists without even
trying. We don't need to do anything to acquire racist beliefs. Though not
born with racist beliefs, we soon enough pick them up. For the unlucky,
their parents, families, and friends are their first teachers. For the lucky, hav-
ing grown up among a more enlightened circle of intimates, popular culture
steps in to teach the association. 5' Falling into the racism habit is easy.
Perhaps the legislature should therefore make it a crime to fail to try
to purge oneself of racist beliefs. If, as it should, this crime required the
state to prove that the actor realized he possessed such beliefs, those who
in fact possessed such beliefs would not be guilty if those beliefs were
tucked away in the unconscious. Given the subtle nature of modern-day
racism, this description probably applies to many, if not most, people
who possess such beliefs. On the other hand, if the crime did not require
the state to prove that the actor realized he possessed such beliefs, the
unconscious racist would not escape punishment, but giving him his just
deserts would be unjust. Punishing an actor for failing to discharge an
obligation is unfair if he is unaware of the facts placing him under that
obligation in the first place," 6 even if he need not be aware of the obliga-
tion itself.'°7
Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74
J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1464, 1464 (1998). For a recent update and "assessment on
[the] current status" of the IAT, see Brian A. Nosek et al., The Implicit Association Test at
Age 7: A Methodological and Conceptual Review, in Social Psychology and the
Unconscious: The Automaticity of Higher Mental Processes 265, 266 (John A. Bargh ed.,
2007). But see Hal R. Arkes & Philip E. Tetlock, Attributions of Implicit Prejudice, or
"Would Jesse Jackson 'Fail' the Implicit Association Test?", I5 Psychol. Inquiry 257, 257
(2004) (offering "three objections to the inferential leap from the comparative [reaction
time] of different associations to the attribution of implicit prejudice").
o5. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1489, 1556 (zoos)
("[Vliolent crime stories [on the local news] can ... exacerbate implicit bias. ").
Io6. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Criminal Liability for Omissions: An Inventory of
Issues, in Criminal Law Theory, supra note 63, at 121, 124 (noting that "[w]hat authorities
there are on [the] point generally agree that liability for failing [to discharge a duty to act]
does not attach to those who are unaware of the facts that give rise to the duty").
107. See id. (noting that an actor can be held liable for an omission even though he is
unaware of the obligation to act but suggesting that this result might violate the principle
of legality).
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Maybe the legislature should instead demand that all adults periodically
attend state-sponsored diversity training classes, or something along simi-
lar lines, with the purpose of divesting its citizens of their racism. Failure
to attend would result in a fine. Three or more such failures could mean
jail time. Citizens subject to such an obligation would have little trouble
meeting it, assuming they were aware of it. All you would need to do is
attend class. Consequently, the principle of legality would not stand in the
way of the state creating such a crime. Neither would it stand in the way
of the state's reliance on an analogous forfeiture rule. But it seems to me
that another principle would stand in the way.
3. Liberalism
The third problem with the character-choice theory cuts to the chase.
According to the prevailing orthodoxy,'°8 a liberal state can legitimately
criminalize acts if and because those acts cause or risk causing harm, even
if the harm targeted is quite remote,0 9 but no other reason will underwrite
criminalization. According to J.S. Mill's influential formulation: "[T]he
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.""
Whatever else the harm principle means, surely it means that a liberal state
io8. For proposed replacements to the harm principle, see, for example, Meir Dan-
Cohen, Defending Dignity, in Meir Dan-Cohen, Harmful Thoughts: Essays on Law, Self,
and Morality 150, 150 (2002) (arguing that liberalism's "harm principle" is not a "neutral
standard" and considering its "replacement... by... the dignity principle: the view that
the main goal of the criminal law is to defend the unique moral worth of every human
being"); Arthur Ripstein, Beyond the Harm Principle, 34 Phil. & Pub Aff 2I5, zI5 (2006)
(arguing that a "commitment to individual sovereignty within a sphere of action in which
you are answerable only to yourself requires that we abandon the harm principle" in favor
of "the sovereignty principle").
to9. See, e.g., Andrew von Hirsch, Extending the Harm Principle: "Remote" Harms
and Fair Imputation, in Harm and Culpability, supra note 41, at 259, 276 (arguing that it
is "important to develop fair-imputation principles when dealing with remote risks," lest
the harm principle lose its effectiveness as a limit on the state's power to punish).
io. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty I3 (Currin V. Shields ed., 1956) (1859). For the classic
modern statements of the harm principle, see i Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the
Criminal Law: Harm to Others (1984); H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (1963).
The harm principle should be understood as a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for
criminalization in a liberal state. See Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law As Last Resort, 24
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cannot legitimately criminalize the simple possession of certain beliefs or
desires." Presumably, a liberal state likewise lacks the authority to force a
person on pain of punishment to do or not to do things with the purpose
of preventing them from possessing state-disapproved beliefs or desires, or
with the purpose of causing them to shed such beliefs or desires-even if
the state's further purpose is to prevent the harm that results from Goetz*-
like cases.
No one doubts that Goetz* acts with the intent to cause harm when he
pulls the trigger on the pistol: He intends to kill. But insofar as Goetz*
would-save for the reasonable-belief rule-be entitled to claim self-
defense, the harm he intends to cause is one the state itself would permit
him to cause. Like anyone else, Goetz* is permitted to kill if and when he
believes that he is about to be killed, and that killing is the only way to
avoid being killed. The real question is whether a liberal state can deny
him that defense because he chose to become or remain a racist. If it can,
then presumably it could also punish a citizen whenever he chooses to act
or not act in ways likely to cause him to become or remain a racist, where
the state's purpose is to prevent him from becoming a racist, or to trans-
form him into a non-racist. But it is hard to see how a liberal state worthy
of the name could do such a thing. On the contrary, one imagines that cit-
izens of liberal states must be free to choose to become or remain racists,
and the liberal state has no choice but to tolerate such choices.
Of course, a liberal state is not totally without tools to combat racism.
For example, it can coerce children to attend school, and while there to
inculcate, or if you prefer, indoctrinate them in the virtues of liberal citi-
zenship, virtues which have no place for the vice of racism. It can likewise
try to persuade its adult citizens to reject racism, speaking out loud and
clear against it. It might even be free to condition the availability of certain
benefits-such as the privileges of carrying a firearm or state employment-
on a citizen's willingness to take part in programs designed to rid participants
Oxford J. Legal Stud. 207, 213-14 (2004). For an argument to the effect that "[c]laims of
harm have become so pervasive that the harm principle has become meaningless," see
Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
109, I13 (1999).
iii. See, e.g., Shlomit Wallerstein, Criminalizing Remote Harm and the Case of Anti-
Democratic Activity, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 2697, 2700 (2007) ("Whatever the exact mean-
ing of the harm principle is, it is indisputable that thoughts and beliefs are excluded from
consideration and, therefore cannot be restricted.").
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of any racist beliefs or desires they might possess. Indeed, more controver-
sially, it might even be free to do things to its citizens-like expose them
to various debiasing stimuli--in order to break the implicit association
most of them are apt to make between black and bad.
But again, what a liberal state cannot do is to force its citizens on pain
of punishment to do or not do things with the purpose of ridding them
of their racism, or of preventing their infection in the first place, even if
that means that some citizens will, because of their racism, come to believe
that a fellow citizen is about to kill him when in fact he is not. Liberal
states can use the criminal law in order to punish acts or omissions that
cause or risk causing harms, but they cannot use it in order to punish acts
or omissions that cause or risk causing the possession or retention of
beliefs and desires, however illiberal the content of those beliefs and desires
may be. Nor does it matter whether the punishing is done directly through
rules of liability, or indirectly through forfeiture rules like the reasonable-
belief rule.
CONCLUSION
Cases like Goetz* leave the liberal state in an awkward position. On the
one hand, it does not want to acquit Goetz* because it does not want its
citizens to believe that it condones the racism that caused him to believe
that he was about to be killed. On the other hand, it can rely upon none
of the theories examined above as a basis to deny him an acquittal.
Goetz* cannot be punished for the killing alone, since he killed only
because he believed he was about to be killed, and but for the reasonable-
belief rule, the law permits him to kill under those circumstances. Nor
can he be punished for forming the belief that he was about to be killed.
He had no control over that. Nor can he be punished for being a racist,
or for choosing to become or remain one. Liberal states do not punish
people for who they are, nor do they punish them for choosing to
become or remain who they are.
112. See Kang, supra note 105, at 158o, 1585 (describing "numerous variations on a strat-
egy of debiasing public service announcements (d-PSAs)" meant to "counter [the] implic-
it [biasing] fire [of local news] with implicit [debiasing] fire").
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If an actor kills only because he believed that he was about to be killed,
and if he believed that he was about to be killed only because he was a
racist, we can and should condemn the racism that lead to the belief
Citizens of liberal states should not be racists. Nonetheless, a liberal state
has no basis upon which it can legitimately say that such an actor forfeits
his claim of self-defense. Punishing an actor like Goetz* is not the liberal
way to get to a liberal society. On the contrary, foregoing the punishment
of such an actor is the price one pays for a liberal society in which the only
legitimate basis upon which the state can punish a citizen is his choice to
cause or risk causing harm when that choice is one the law does not per-
mit him to make.
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